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LEAVE AS AN ACCOMMODATION: WHEN IS 
ENOUGH, ENOUGH?1 
STACY A. HICKOX* AND JOSEPH M. GUZMAN** 
ABSTRACT 
The right to reasonable accommodations under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act includes leave that will enable an employee with a 
disability to return to work rather than being discharged. This right may 
seem unreasonable for an employer needing employees to be at work to 
be productive, raising the question of when leave as an accommodation 
becomes unreasonable or imposes an undue hardship on an employer. In 
the absence of specific guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit 
courts apply a variety of approaches, ranging from individualized analysis 
to determinations that any leave exceeding some number of weeks is 
unreasonable. In this paper, three hundred and fifty-three decisions 
addressing this question have been analyzed to determine which factors 
are determinative of reasonableness, including factors identified in the 
various approaches of the circuit courts as well as those which economists 
would use to determine the value of an employee and the cost of replacing 
that employee. 
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Most employees need to be present at work to perform their jobs. At the same 
time, employees with disabilities have the right to reasonable accommodation under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The unavailability of accommodations 
has been identified as a significant barrier to the full employment of people with 
disabilities.2 But does reasonable accommodation include an employer’s toleration 
of leave from work? Discrimination prohibited by the ADA includes an employer’s 
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified . . . employee,” unless the employer can show 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s 
operations.3 
Reasonable accommodation can include absences or leave from work, according 
to both the federal courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).4 The duty of accommodation was included in the ADA to provide 
unemployed persons with disabilities an opportunity to work and retain a position 
once hired.5 Leave as an accommodation may be essential for employees with 
disabilities who need time off for treatment or to wait for remission of symptoms 
that prevent them from working.6 To enforce this right to accommodation, the EEOC 
has been targeting employers with leave policies that result in the discharge of 
                                                                                                                                         
 2 David C. Baldridge & Michele L. Swift, Withholding Requests for Disability 
Accommodation: The Role of Individual Differences and Disability Attributes, 39 J. MGT. 743, 
744 (2013). 
 3 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2014). 
 4 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter EEOC, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. 
 5 See John R. Autry, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers 
Required to Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say “Yes” but the Law Says 
“No”, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 665, 666 (2004); Amy Renee Brown, Note, Mental Disabilities 
Under the ADA: The Role of Employees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. 
U. J. L. & POL’Y 341 (2002) (ADA “promise[s] a bright future of inclusion and integration for 
individuals with disabilities” by “adding them into the mainstream of American life”). 
 6 See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: 
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 445 (2002). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/8
2014] LEAVE AS AN ACCOMMODATION 439 
 
employees with disabilities without individual consideration of that employee’s need 
for an accommodation.7 
From the employer’s perspective, leave policies and the ability to discharge 
absent employees are important to overall productivity, since an employee on leave 
is not performing. In addition to productivity concerns, an employer’s reluctance to 
grant leave as an accommodation may be based on some notion that all employees 
should be treated the same, or a perceived lack of connection between the request for 
leave and the employee’s disability.8 Employers may also be reluctant to grant leave 
as an accommodation because leave may place a relatively greater burden on both 
employers and coworkers, compared to other accommodations.9  
This apparent conflict in interests between employers and employees raises the 
question of where courts should draw the line on requiring at least some leave as an 
accommodation for an employee with a disability; i.e., how much leave is 
reasonable? As one employers’ attorney explained, employers need further guidance 
on “what limitations they may place on leaves they offer and the extent of the duty to 
hold an employee’s position open during the leave, while still effectively running 
their businesses.”10 In addition, employers need guidance as to how to show that 
leave as an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, thus relieving them of 
the responsibility of providing the leave.11 
Since the ADA came into effect for employers in 1992, the law defining 
reasonable accommodation has been described as “woefully underdeveloped.”12 This 
lack of guidance from the courts could be due to the imprecise nature of the concepts 
of “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship.”13 Experts have called on the 
                                                                                                                                         
 7 See, e.g., EEOC, Truck Firm Settle for $4.85 Million Nationwide ADA Case Regarding 
Leave Policy, BNA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW RESOURCE CENTER, http:// 
laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/2453/.  
 8 Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the Disability” Under the Americans with 
Disablities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 
BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 348, 350-51, 353 (2006) (accommodation should address 
limitations arising from impairment). 
 9 Befort, supra note 6, at 442, 448-49. 
 10 Ellen McLaughlin, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as 
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
meetings/6-8-11/mclaughlin.cfm; see also Edward Isler, Statement before the EEOC Meeting 
to Examine Use of Leave as Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-11/isler.cfm (“Many aspects of the ADA, particularly 
those dealing with absences purportedly necessitated by a medical condition that may or may 
not qualify as a disability, remain as ambiguous and ill-defined (if not more so) than when the 
law first became effective.”). 
 11 See Peter J. Petesch, EEOC Moves Toward Guidance Addressing Leave as a 
Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, BNA Insights (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/display/story_list.adp?mode=ins&frag_id=21182
889&prod=dlln (additional guidance would benefit both employees and employers). 
 12 Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. Phillips, Overview of Reasonable Accommodation and 
the Shifting Emphasis from Who is Disabled to Who Can Work, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 472, 
481 (2011). 
 13 Befort, supra note 6, at 441. 
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EEOC to provide guidelines so that determinations about what accommodations are 
reasonable can be more consistent and based on concrete, objective factors.14 Even 
though EEOC held hearings on the issue of leave as an accommodation in 2011, no 
specific guidance has been provided. 
This lack of guidance has led to an “expectations gap” between an employee 
requesting an accommodation and his or her employer, due to the ADA’s “self-
conscious ambiguity about rights and responsibilities.”15 To resolve this gap, the 
parties need to exchange and consider information that is relevant to the 
reasonableness of the accommodation, which may include “how the impairment 
operates, how it interacts with the employer’s workplace and the worker’s job, how 
it might affect co-workers, and the worker’s prognosis” as well as the employer’s 
information regarding production and costs.16 
This exchange of information is required under the ADA’s obligation to engage 
in the interactive process.17 The process should include a thorough analysis 
regarding what duties are essential to the position for which an employee seeks 
accommodations.18 This analysis will help the employer determine whether the 
accommodation is even reasonable.  
Rather than focusing on an employee’s ability to perform the essential duties of a 
position, many appellate courts reviewing the reasonableness of leave as an 
accommodation have focused on the length or indefiniteness of the leave request, 
and have given significant deference to employers’ leave policies.19 This approach 
does not take into consideration the value of a particular employee or the difficulty 
of “covering” for that employee while he or she is on leave. In contrast, a smaller 
number of appellate courts require that an employer demonstrate an undue hardship 
caused by an employee’s use of leave, after considering the medical evidence 
regarding the employee’s ability to return to work as well as the specific job duties 
of the employee.20 
The more individualized approach is supported by labor economists’ cost benefit 
analysis, which supports consideration of an individual employee’s value to the 
employer, as well as the cost of replacing that employee, when determining whether 
leave is a reasonable accommodation. 21  Thus, employers should provide more leave 
to employees with higher skills and greater longevity. Such analysis would also 
                                                                                                                                         
 14 Brian East, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as 
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
meetings/6-8-11/east.cfm. 
 15 Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction Costs, and Mediation: 
Evidence from the EEOC's Mediation Program, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008). 
 16 Id. at 9. 
 17 See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) (2012); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 
1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 18 Collins & Phillips, supra note 12, at 498-99. 
 19 See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text (discussion of length of leave); infra 
notes 144-99 and accompanying text (discussion on indefinite leave). 
 20 See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue hardship defense). 
 21 Edward P. Lazear, Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions, 17 J. OF 
LAB. ECON. 199, 223 (1999). 
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support policies regarding the use of leave that are tailored to the needs of that 
particular workplace, including the size of the workforce and the particular skills and 
abilities required of the workforce. 
This article will demonstrate how appellate courts vary significantly in their 
approach to reviewing the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation. Some 
guidance is provided by one Supreme Court decision that allowed deference to an 
employer’s seniority policy that came into conflict with a request for a transfer as an 
accommodation.22 Both before and after this decision, appellate courts have taken a 
variety of approaches in addressing the question of how much leave is reasonable as 
an accommodation, and when leave imposes an undue hardship on an employer. 
Some courts only require leave of a definite duration, placing the burden on the 
employee to provide evidence of when he or she will return to work.23 Appellate 
courts also consider an employer’s policies to determine what length of leave should 
be deemed reasonable, while others will require that the employer establish that the 
leave will impose an undue hardship.24 
Our analysis of both appellate and trial court opinions since 1992 demonstrates 
that certain factors emerge as significant determinants of whether leave will be 
required as a reasonable accommodation. Appellate and trial court decisions since 
the passage of the ADA are reviewed and analyzed to determine what consideration 
is given to the employee-related factors that would seem relevant to the questions of 
reasonableness and undue hardship, including the length of the leave as well as the 
person’s particular job duties, tenure with the employer, type of impairment, skill 
level, and industry. The significance of the appellate courts’ emphasis on the 
certainty of when the employee can be expected to be able to return to work as well 
as the significance of medical evidence related to the need for leave are tested. The 
impact of employers’ leave policies and the influence of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act requirements are also measured. The analysis also tests the significance of 
an employee’s particular job duties or responsibilities. This statistical analysis 
demonstrates which factors play a significant role in the reasonableness of a 
particular employee’s request for leave as an accommodation. 
This detailed review of appellate decisions and analysis of decisions regarding 
the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation gives employers and courts 
guidance on what factors have been influential on the success of employees’ claims. 
These influential factors can then be compared to the factors that should be 
considered from an economic perspective in determining whether an accommodation 
is reasonable or imposes an undue hardship. 
I. ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA 
Accommodation is only required if it enables a person with a disability to 
perform the essential functions of his or her employment position.25 For an employee 
seeking leave as an accommodation, this means that the employee will not be 
protected against discrimination unless the leave would at least eventually enable 
                                                                                                                                         
 22 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 23 See infra notes 144-99 and accompanying text (discussion of indefinite leave). 
 24 See infra notes 228-58 and accompanying text (discussion of employer policies); infra 
notes 272-94 (undue hardship defense). 
 25 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
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that employee to perform his or her essential duties. An employer must take 
reasonable steps to accommodate an employee’s disability unless the 
accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business” 
of the employer.26 Thus, accommodations can be used to preserve the employee’s 
status as a “qualified individual,” but reasonableness should be assessed based on 
“the needs and disability of the employee and the resources and expectations of the 
employer.”27  
The ADA’s accommodation requirement has been characterized as a way for 
people with disabilities to overcome systemic subordination and oppression.28 Even 
though non-discrimination laws generally emphasize equal treatment, the right to 
reasonable accommodations provides for alterations in conditions of employment to 
enable persons with disabilities to work. With this duty to accommodate, Congress 
recognized that “in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them 
differently.”29 
Despite this attempt, there is a lack of evidence that the ADA has “substantially 
improved” the employment opportunities of persons with disabilities.30 The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reports that in 2011, persons with disabilities had a labor force 
participation rate of 17.8%, compared to a participation rate of 63.6% for others.31 
This shows a decrease from 2009, where the labor force participation rate for 
persons with disabilities was 21.5%, compared to a participation rate of 73.7% for 
others.32 Although not confirmed by research, this lower employment rate logically 
                                                                                                                                         
 26 Id. § 12112 (b)(5)(A). 
 27 Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and 
Resistance under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 68 (2008) (referencing EEOC's 
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 28 Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (2003). 
 29 Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1045 (2000). 
 30 Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, The Employment Discrimination Provisions of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation and Impact, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 
3 (2007); David C. Stapleton et al., Has the Employment Rate of People with Disabilities 
Declined?, CORNELL U. EMP. & DISABILITY INST., 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ilr. 
cornell.edu/edi/publications/PB_EmpDecline.pdf; see also Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. 
Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001) (noting decline in employment among 
disabled persons after passage of ADA); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 
114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (2004) (noting drop in employment rate for persons with disabilities 
during the 1990s); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 693, 705 (2000) (noting that statistics show ADA led to 
relative decrease in employment). 
 31 Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics—2011, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (June 8, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disabl_06082012.htm. 
 32 Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics—2009, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mroe-88nsrh/$File/Disabilities 
%20Employment%202009.pdf. 
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may be due at least in part to employers’ refusal to provide leave as an 
accommodation, since discharge is often the alternative to extending leave as an 
accommodation. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the affirmative right to accommodation by 
placing a fairly low burden on employees to show that a requested accommodation is 
reasonable,33 which is shown if the accommodation “seems reasonable on its face.”34 
An employee may be able to meet this burden by showing that other employers in 
the industry provide similar accommodations or “some of the more obvious and 
visible circumstances” of the employer indicating that the accommodation is 
“facially practicable.”35 An accommodation may have been deemed reasonable in 
“the run of cases” or in the opinion of the Job Accommodation Network, which 
provides expert and confidential guidance on accommodations for employers.36 A 
strict cost-benefit analysis need not support a request for an accommodation to make 
it reasonable, but the cost should not be disproportionate to the benefit to the 
employee with a disability. 37 
Some see accommodation requirements as unwarranted preferential treatment for 
employees with disabilities.38 Justice Scalia and other experts argue that the 
reasonable accommodation requirement unduly restricts the discretion of 
employers;39 others believe that the federal courts have narrowly defined the duty to 
                                                                                                                                         
 33 Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 
the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 144 
(2003) [hereinafter Harris, Re-Thinking]. 
 34 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02; see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (enough for plaintiff to suggest plausible 
accommodation). 
 35 Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 145. 
 36 East, supra note 14. See also Job Accomodation Network’s (JAN) extensive 
Accommodation and Compliance Series for both general guidance (EMPLOYERS’ PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
(May 15, 2009), available at http://askjan.org/ErGuide/ErGuide.pdf) and regarding conditions 
as diverse as Parkinson’s Disease (http://askjan.org/media/PD.html), hepatitis (http://askjan. 
org/media/hep.html), mental health impairments (http://askjan.org/media/Psychiatric.html), 
migraine headaches (http://askjan.org/media/Migraine.html), cancer (http://askjan.org/ 
media/Cancer.html), lupus (http://askjan.org/media/Lupus.html), and arthritis (http:// 
askjan.org/media/Arthritis.html). 
 37 Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 149-50; see also VandeZande v. Wis. Dep’t. of 
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (benefits of accommodation need not exceed its 
costs for it to be reasonable); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
 38 Stewart Schwab & Steven Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2003). 
 39 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 418-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion 
“incorrectly subjects all employer rules and practices to the requirement of reasonable 
accommodation” even where the rule or practice does not work to exclude a disabled 
employee because of the employee's disability); see also Thomas F. O’Neil III & Kenneth M. 
Reiss, Reassigning Disabled Employees Under the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of 
Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 360 (2001) (criticizing the approach of some courts on the 
 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
444 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:437 
accommodate in a way that has favored employers.40 Despite some resistance to 
requiring accommodations, employers have been “reasonably responsive” to 
employees’ requests for accommodation.41 Accommodations may be required where 
the cost or disruption is minimal, but many employers may consider leave as a costly 
and disruptive form of accommodation. 
These different outlooks toward accommodation are exemplified in the debate 
over how much leave should be granted as an accommodation, since an employee 
obviously is not productive while on leave, but he or she could return to work as a 
productive employee at the end of the leave. One court noted this quandary: “[T]he 
idea of unpaid leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation presents a 
troublesome problem, partly because of the oxymoronic anomaly it harbors—the 
idea that allowing a disabled employee to leave a job allows him to perform that 
job’s functions.”42 
A. Leave as an Accommodation 
If an employee cannot perform the essential duties of his or her position because 
of the limitations of his or her disability, but could regain that ability in the future, 
then leave may be a reasonable accommodation. Appellate courts have been 
consistent in recognizing that some amount of leave may be a reasonable 
accommodation, at least in some circumstances.43 This begs the question of how 
much leave is reasonable. 
Leave may be needed as an accommodation for various reasons: obtaining 
medical treatment, recovering from an illness or episode, or receiving disability-
related training.44 The length of leave available as an accommodation also affects the 
                                                                                                                                         
grounds that their interpretations of the reasonable accommodation requirement unduly limit 
employer discretion). 
 40 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 101, 108 (1999); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and 
the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, Neutral Policies] (courts may be reluctant 
to require that the employer depart from neutral policy “because they cannot get beyond 
thinking about the ADA in traditional Title VII terms”). 
 41 Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
305, 307 (2008). 
 42 Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 185 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 43 See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir.1998); Walton v. Mental Health 
Ass’n. of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (“unpaid leave supplementing regular sick 
and personal days might, under other facts, represent a reasonable accommodation”); 
Haschmann v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir.1998); Brannon v. Luco 
Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 
1247 (9th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 967 (10th 
Cir. 2002); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1996); see 
also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2012) (note discussing § 1630.2(o) and identifying leave as a 
reasonable accommodation). 
 44 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 3.10(4) 
(1992), available at http://ia600504.us.archive.org/21/items/technicalassista00unse/technical 
assista00unse.pdf; EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at text preceding Q&A 17; 
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opportunity for reassignment as an accommodation, since an employer is only 
required to consider employees with disabilities for positions which are vacant at the 
time they seek a transfer.45 Even if there is no position available for the employee 
with a disability at the start of his or her leave, reassignment could still be a 
reasonable accommodation if a position becomes available while that employee is 
still out on a reasonable amount of leave.46 
The reasonableness of leave as an accommodation can also be significant for an 
employee with a disability who seeks to return to work, but the employer prefers to 
offer leave as an accommodation. In that situation, the employee may seek to 
establish that leave would be an unreasonable accommodation so as to force the 
employer to provide some other accommodation that would enable him or her to 
return to work.47 Likewise, a reasonable amount of leave could ameliorate a direct 
threat posed by an employee with a disability.48 These various reasons behind 
requests for leave as an accommodation explain why more than three hundred and 
fifty claims have been litigated on this issue since the ADA came into effect.  
B. EEOC Guidance 
EEOC Guidelines recognize leave as a reasonable accommodation.49 Generally, 
reasonable accommodations include “modifications or adjustments that enable an . . . 
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as 
are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.”50 An 
employer should first try to keep the employee in his or her existing job, if a 
                                                                                                                                         
see also Christopher Kuczynski, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of 
Leave as Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-11/kuczynski.cfm. 
 45 See, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 46 See, e.g., Rowe v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., No. 1:09-cv-182-DBH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
102969, at *39-40 (D. Me. Aug. 17, 2010) (nurse could have been reassigned to another 
position in short amount of time if kept on leave); Boykin v. ATC/Vancom of Colo., L.P., 247 
F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2001); Lally v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 95C4220, 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386, at *64 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) (employer not required to create 
position as accommodation). 
 47 See, e.g., Hankins v. The Gap, 84 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1996) (leave was reasonable 
accommodation instead of transfer to another position); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 485, 514 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (disability leave in lieu of transfer to another position 
argued by employer to be reasonable accommodation); Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, No. 
1:06-cv-01137, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37176, at *49-50 (W.D. Tenn. May 1, 2009) (leave 
instead of providing other accommodations at work could be considered adverse action for 
employee who sought to return to work); Nagel v. Husky Lima Refinery, No. 3:09CV828, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30122, at *23 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2011) (employer’s provision of 
short and long term disability was reasonable accommodation). 
 48 See, e.g., Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2004) (plaintiff argued that 
leave would reduce threat). 
 49 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2013) (emphasis added).  
 50 Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9, p. 364 (2013) (“reasonable 
accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to . . . equal 
employment opportunity . . . are removed or alleviated”). 
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reasonable accommodation would enable the employee to perform the essential job 
duties of that position.51 If the employee cannot perform the essential job duties, then 
leave is a form of reasonable accommodation. 52 
If leave is a reasonable accommodation, the burden moves to the employer to 
show that the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship in its 
particular circumstances.53 While these guidelines establish the EEOC’s position that 
leave can be a reasonable accommodation if it does not impose an undue hardship, 
little attention is given to the differences among employees that may affect the 
reasonableness and relative cost to the employer arising from tolerating leave as an 
accommodation. 
C. Research on Accommodations 
Research on accommodations including leave sheds some light on how 
employers view their obligations under the ADA and which employees may be 
benefitting from the ADA’s protections. A study of accommodations provided or 
refused by employers who requested consultation from the Job Accommodation 
Network (JAN) revealed a lack of significant relationship between employee 
demographic and employer variables and the provision of an accommodation.54 
Specifically, accommodation decisions were not related to employees’ age, gender, 
education, annual salary or wages, or years with the company.55 Likewise, direct 
benefit estimates were not significantly related to company size or calendar year 
direct costs, but were significantly positively associated with wages.56 Employees 
with higher wages likely are more expensive to replace because recruitment, 
training, and start-up costs may be greater.57 In providing accommodations, the 
employer avoids those costs and realizes a greater net benefit.58 
Almost all employers using JAN reported that providing an accommodation 
benefited the company through retention (91.6%) and/or promotion (11.3%) of a 
qualified employee.59 Other direct benefits reported included eliminating the cost of 
training a new employee (59.5%), saving on worker’s compensation or insurance 
                                                                                                                                         
 51 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 
(“Efforts should be made, however, to accommodate an employee in the position that he or 
she was hired to fill before reassignment is considered.”); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
§ 1630.2(o) (2013) (“In general, reassignment should be considered only when 
accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an undue hardship [to the 
employer].”); EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 39 (“Reassignment is the 
reasonable accommodation of last resort.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402. 
 54 Helen A. Schartz et al., Symposium, Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of 
Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 936 (2006). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 940. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 939. 
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costs (43.0%), increasing the accommodated worker’s productivity (76.7%), 
improving the accommodated worker’s attendance (53.3%), increasing the diversity 
of the company (41.4%), and “other” direct benefits (20.1%).60 
Other related studies have found that employers often benefit from providing 
accommodations to their incumbent employees. Significantly, the benefits gained by 
employers frequently outweigh their costs, meaning that accommodations benefit 
employers as well as their employees with disabilities.61 An earlier JAN study 
showed that both employers and individuals reported that a significant level of 
limitation due to the disability could be mitigated significantly by 
accommodations.62 Of the employers surveyed who had been requested to provide 
an accommodation, only 8.4% decided it was not possible to accommodate the 
individual without creating an undue hardship.63 Of two hundred and twelve 
employers providing cost information regarding the accommodation(s) made, half 
reported no cost, and another 42.0% reported that the costs incurred were one-time 
only in nature, for a median cost of six hundred dollars.64 
In line with these studies, an economic perspective suggests that “rational 
employers should choose to accommodate their employees with disabilities because 
employers will often benefit from that choice.”65 Accommodations allow employers 
to retain members of their internal labor market, which preserves productivity-
enhancing firm-specific skills and knowledge.66 This potential led one employer 
representative to suggest that length of service should be considered favorably in 
determining whether a leave is a reasonable accommodation.67 At the same time, an 
employee with specialized or advanced skills may not be replaced easily, through 
reassignment or temporary workers, if he or she takes leave as an accommodation.68 
This indispensable employee may arguably be less able to show that his or her leave 
would not impose an undue burden. 
Employers may also benefit from providing accommodations since the provision 
of an accommodation may increase that employee’s commitment to the internal 
                                                                                                                                         
 60 Id. 
 61 Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Part I—Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902-04 
(1997). 
 62 D. J. Hendricks et al., Cost and Effectiveness of Accommodations in the Workplace: 
Preliminary Results of a Nationwide Study, 25 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2005), available at 
http://www.dsq-sds.org /article/view/623/800. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market, 10 
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 6 (2007) [hereinafter Harris, Internal Labor]. 
 66 Id. at 12, 53-54. 
 67 Isler, supra note 10. 
 68 Claudia Center, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as 
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
meetings/6-8-11/center.cfm. 
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labor market, which reduces turnover.69 Retention of employees through 
accommodations also avoids the transaction costs associated with replacing 
employees from the external labor market.70 These costs would increase if an 
employer does not provide leave as an accommodation, although there may be some 
costs associated with finding a temporary replacement. 
To determine whether an accommodation is reasonable, economists have 
suggested the development of a “reasonable accommodation cost continuum,” 
ranging from “wholly efficient accommodations” to “wholly inefficient 
accommodations,” which would be deemed unreasonable.71 Between those extremes, 
the reasonableness of a particular accommodation may vary across different 
employers.72 Some economists would allow employers to make their own 
determination regarding the provision of accommodations, assuming that employers 
would provide accommodations that are “utility-maximizing” under a cost-benefit 
analysis.73 Others argue that laws requiring accommodations which are not “utility 
maximizing” for employers may be justified by the redistributive goal of assisting 
workers with disabilities or the normative goal of results-based equality for all 
workers.74 
Reliance on an employer’s cost-benefit analysis would only require an 
accommodation if the burden on the employer were less than the potential of harm to 
the employee from denying the accommodation.75 This raises the issue of how to 
quantify the benefits of an accommodation as well as the difficulty of predicting 
harm to the employee if the accommodation is not provided.76 Discrimination can 
occur when an employer without perfect information about the characteristics of an 
                                                                                                                                         
 69 Harris, Internal Labor, supra note 65, at 35. 
 70 Id. at 52. 
 71 Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 
DUKE L.J. 79, 144-78 (2003). 
 72 Id. at 179. 
 73 Rachel Arnow-Richman, Indenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law 
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1096 (2010) 
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007) (“[E]conomics is the 
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited . . . is to explore the 
implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his . . . ‘self-interest.’”); Russell 
Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 447 (2004) (“[T]he term 
‘rational choice theory’ lacks a single, standard definition. . . . [M]ost versions of [rational 
choice theory] assume, at a minimum, that individuals will use all available information to 
select behaviors that maximize their expected utility.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 74 Arnow-Richman, supra note 73, at 1098; see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 957-75 (2003) (tracing 
themes of “welfare reform” and the “cost saving” function of the ADA in the political 
movement culminating in the statute's adoption); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and 
“Real Efficiency”: A Unified Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (“[T]he 
ADA can be seen as a way for taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the 
disabled population onto employers.”). 
 75 Stein, supra note 71, at 113. 
 76 Id. 
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employee with a disability bases its assessment on inaccurate “indicators” to 
evaluate those individuals’ present or future performance, especially when combined 
with the general assumption that employees with disabilities are less productive than 
nondisabled employees.77 For an employee requesting leave as an accommodation, 
the harm of no accommodation may be clear if the employee is discharged without 
the accommodation, but the probability that the accommodation of additional leave 
would prevent that harm is much less predictable. 
Employers’ absence and disability management (ADM) practices have not been 
effective in the retention of employees with disabilities. Surveyed employers 
believed, on average, that their ADM practices were only a little better than “slightly 
effective” in delaying or preventing exits from employment due to health conditions 
or other impairments, and more than half believed that ADM practices were no more 
than slightly effective in overall retention.78 Relevant to the treatment of leave as an 
accommodation, consistent return to work practices were deemed one of the most 
important factors in delaying or preventing exit from the workforce and improving 
retention.79 
Rather than focusing on individual employee characteristics, employers tend to 
focus on the overall costs associated with employee absenteeism and use of leave, 
stressing the real business cost of leave arising from its usage.80 A study of employee 
absenteeism conducted in 2010 highlights potential costs which could be associated 
with leave as an accommodation, including direct costs such as paid time off, 
overtime for remaining employees covering the work of an absent employee, and 
costs to engage temporary employees, as well as intangible costs such as (with 
percentages of employers reporting these costs in parentheses): 
? Significant losses in productivity because work is completed by less 
effective, temporary workers or last-minute substitutes, or overtired, 
overburdened employees working overtime who may be slower and 
more susceptible to error (42%)  
? Lower quality and less accountability for quality (59%)  
? Disruption of work of other employees (80%) 
? Increased stress on overburdened co-workers (78%)  
? Lower morale (63%)81 
Total costs for extended absences are estimated at 2.9% of an employer’s payroll, 
and a net loss in productivity per day of 16%.82 The work of extended leave users is 
most often covered by co-workers (40-46% of the time, depending on type of work), 
                                                                                                                                         
 77 Id. at 128, 130. 
 78 Rochelle Habeck et al., Employee Retention and Integrated Disability Management 
Practices as Demand Side Factors, 20 J. OCCUP. REHABIL. 443, 449 (2010). 
 79 Id. at 450. 
 80 McLaughlin, supra note 10. 
 81 Mercer & Kronos Inc., Survey on the Total Financial Impact of Employee Absences, at 
15 (June 2010), available at http://www.kronos.com/elqNow/elqRedir.htm?ref=http 
%3a%2f%2fwww.kronos.com%2fworkarea%2fDownloadAsset.aspx%3fid%3d1396%26dd%
3d1. 
 82 Id. at 8. 
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followed by supervisors (14-23% of the time), 7-12% by floaters, 15-17% by temps 
or contractors, and 0-17% by overtime work.83 The cost of hiring and training 
replacement workers has been estimated at 2-4% of payroll.84 Replacement workers 
were estimated to be 79% as efficient as the original worker on extended leave.85 
Generally, such costs may prevent an employer “from operating its business in an 
efficient and effective manner.”86 Indirect costs can lead to higher employee 
turnover, which can lead to higher training costs, more quality control issues, less 
accountability for quality, and less reliability.87 In particular, sporadic, unplanned 
absences may create greater costs for employers.88 
As an additional indirect cost, some argue that the review of requests for 
accommodation should focus on the effect of accommodations on other employees.89 
Arguably, leave could have some effect on other employees who may be required to 
handle additional job duties.90 In several cases, courts have concluded that job 
restructuring or a proposed modification of a disabled employee’s work schedule 
that would result in other employees having to work longer or harder is not a 
reasonable accommodation.91 
To control the costs of absenteeism, many employers offer not more than 
between twelve and twenty-six weeks of leave; only some specifically provide that 
additional leave “may be considered as a reasonable accommodation on a case-by-
case basis.”92 A maximum duration for the leave is often set by policy to provide 
employers with “some level of control over their ability to manage their headcount 
and business operations” and as a way to avoid discriminatory decisions.93 Some 
would presume that employers choose the amount of leave allowed “based on an 
analysis of how much absence from work it can bear.”94 In line with the use of leave 
policies to control attendance, one study showed that absence days ranged from 4.0 
to 7.2 among employers with such formal policies, whereas absent days at employers 
with no formal policy ranged from 3.5 to 10.3 days.95 
                                                                                                                                         
 83 Id. at 13. 
 84 L. J. Bassi and M.E. Van Buren, Sharpening the Leading Edge: State of the Industry 
Report (Alexandria, VA: Society for Training and Development 1999). 
 85 Id. at 14. 
 86 McLaughlin, supra note 10. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Isler, supra note 10. 
 89 Alex B. Long, The ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent 
Third Parties”, 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 870 (2003). 
 90 Id. at 871. 
 91 Id. at 878. 
 92 McLaughlin, supra note 10. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Mercer & Kronos Inc., supra note 81, at 17. 
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Accommodations that call for adjustments in policies may meet greater 
resistance from employers than other requests for accommodations. One survey 
found that among private employers who made changes to leave policies to meet the 
needs of employees with disabilities, 10% reported that it was “very difficult” or 
“difficult” to make those changes.96 In a survey of employees who sought 
accommodations, more than 40% reported requesting leave as an accommodation, 
and 88.75% reported that the request was granted; however, among those whose 
request was denied, 51.4% attributed the denial to an inflexible leave policy.97 
These studies suggest that leave as an accommodation should be considered in 
terms of the employee’s particular characteristics, such as longevity with the 
company, as well as other circumstances unique to the employer involved, such as 
the effect of leave usage on overall productivity and other employees. Yet employers 
may not conduct such an individualized analysis willingly; instead, employers 
naturally focus on the overall costs of absenteeism.98 This raises the question of 
whether courts’ enforcement of the right to leave as an accommodation does or 
should force employers to engage in a more individualized assessment of the effects 
of leave usage. 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF REQUESTS FOR LEAVE AS ACCOMMODATION 
Appellate courts take a variety of approaches in reviewing the use of leave as a 
reasonable accommodation. Some courts do not even reach the question of whether 
leave can be a reasonable accommodation, instead finding that an absent employee is 
not ever otherwise qualified.99 Even if the reasonableness of the leave is addressed, 
several appellate courts focus only on the amount of leave used or requested, or the 
definiteness of the amount of leave needed, to determine whether the leave would be 
a reasonable accommodation.100 This approach does not consider the particular value 
of the employee to the employer’s operations, or the specific direct or indirect costs 
associated with that employee’s use of leave. 
A second group of appellate courts may consider the employer’s leave policy or 
the right to leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to determine if the 
                                                                                                                                         
 96 Susanne M. Bruyere, Disability Employment Policies and Practices in Private and 
Federal Sector Organizations 15 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Program on Employment 
and Disability, School of Industrial and Labor Relations 2000), available at http:// 
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/63/. 
 97 Sarah von Schrader et al., EMERGING EMPLOYMENT ISSUES FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES 25-26 (Cornell University 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1288&context=edicollect; see also Kevin McGowan, 
Statement at EEOC Public Hearing on Leave As Reasonable Accommodation Under ADA, 
EEOC (June 13, 2011) (summarizing testimony of Ellen McLaughlin, a partner with Seyfarth 
Shaw in Chicago, available at http://www.bna.com/eeoc-holds-public-n12884902106/ 
(summarizing testimony of Ellen McLaughlin, a partner with Seyfarth Shaw in Chicago, 
regarding employer resistance to variation from leave policies). 
 98 See Mercer & Kronos Inc., supra note 81. 
 99 See, e.g., Kempter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 13-1036, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17930, 
at *12-15 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013) (focus on inability to perform essential duties & lack of 
other positions); Cash v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., No. 13-5467, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *10-13 
(6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (focus on failure to request job transfer). 
 100 See infra notes 95-176 and accompanying text. 
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leave request is reasonable.101 Often the determination of reasonableness under these 
first two approaches is made on a motion for summary judgment without any 
requirement that the employer demonstrate undue hardship based on the actual or 
specific costs associated with that use of leave. This focus on reasonableness rather 
than undue hardship on the employer has been criticized as a way for the “cycle of 
discrimination” to continue “unchecked,” because such a broad basis for denying 
accommodation could allow the influence of prejudices or biases against people with 
disabilities.102 
A third, smaller number of circuit courts focus on the hardship caused by a 
particular employee’s use of leave.103 These courts may consider the amount of leave 
requested, but also consider whether that leave would unduly harm the particular 
employer’s operations.104 These courts may consider an employer’s leave policy or 
FMLA requirements, but also require that an employer demonstrate that leave 
beyond these requirements would impose an undue hardship.105 This approach 
sometimes takes into account the relative value that a particular employee adds to the 
organization and the costs associated with replacing them.106 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the appellate courts have provided a formula for 
determining what accommodations are reasonable.107 Instead, these different 
approaches lead to significantly different outcomes for employees seeking leave as 
an accommodation.  
A. Amount of Leave 
Claims of employees seeking leave as an accommodation are often dismissed 
based on what the court sees as a significant period leave, or if the leave usage has 
been unscheduled.108 Courts have adopted these “cut offs” even though neither the 
ADA nor the EEOC guidelines indicate what amount of leave would always be 
unreasonable or impose an undue hardship.109 This approach may be based on the 
notion that all employees should be treated equally, regardless of their particular 
position or disability. Across different courts using this approach; however, the leave 
amounts deemed unreasonable may range from one week to eighteen months, 
without any consideration of expectations regarding ability to return or any undue 
hardship on the employer.110 Under this approach, the employer need not show that 
any additional leave would be costly or even inconvenient. 
                                                                                                                                         
 101 See infra notes 231-44, 260-68 and accompanying text. 
 102 Basas, supra note 27, at 111-12. 
 103 See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue hardship). 
 104 See infra notes 273-96 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 224-97 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text. 
 107 Basas, supra note 27, at 77. 
 108 See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text. 
 109 East, supra note 14; Center, supra note 68. 
 110 See Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999) (more than 
1 week deemed unreasonable); Dudley v. Cal. Dept. of Trans., No. 99-15892, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5249, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2000) (6 months of leave unreasonable); Nowak v. St. 
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The dismissal of claims by employees who have taken a lengthy amount of leave 
may seem reasonable because of the obvious burden on their employers. However, 
claims have also been dismissed even where the employee used relatively short 
amounts of leave, without any proof of the costs associated with that use of leave.111 
For example, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the claim of an employee of a tree service 
employee who was discharged based on his absence of thirteen days, without any 
showing that the employer suffered any costs or even inconvenience due to that 
absence.112 
As shown by this example, even a short amount of leave has justified the 
dismissal of an employee who cannot perform his or her essential job duties at the 
time of discharge.113 Courts adopting such a “cut off” place the burden on the 
employee to establish that at the time of discharge, he or she “possessed the 
necessary skills to perform his job and that he was willing and able to demonstrate 
these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.”114 In an often-cited opinion, the 
Fifth Circuit held that where an employee was unavailable for work at the time of his 
discharge, the employer was not required to provide any additional leave as an 
accommodation.115 
Relying on this approach, an employer was permitted to discharge an employee 
after just one week of leave, explaining that she was not a qualified individual at the 
time of her discharge.116 Under this strict “otherwise qualified” approach, an 
employer is not required to establish the costs of allowing additional leave.117 This 
approach assumes that any absence requires the reassignment of duties to other 
employees, which is generally considered to be an unreasonable expectation.118 
Courts which dismiss accommodation claims based solely on an employee’s past 
use of leave allow employers to assume that an employee’s past use of leave because 
of a disability is indicative of future attendance at work.119 Based on this assumption, 
                                                                                                                                         
Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998) (teacher took more than 18 months of 
leave and attendance was essential to performance). 
 111 Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 Fed. App’x 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1002-3; Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 
759 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 114 Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003. 
 115 Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759. 
 116 Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999); see also 
Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1999) (attendance is requirement of job); 
Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003), appeal after remand, 125 Fed. 
App’x 704 (7th Cir. 2004) (request for additional leave to treat mental illness seen as 
admission of inability to work at time of discharge). 
 117 Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1048. 
 118 Id.; see also Duello v. Buchanan Co. Bd. of Supers., 628 F.3d 968, 973-74 (8th Cir. 
2010) (employer’s ability to cover previous absences does not make excuse of essential job 
duties reasonable). 
 119 See, e.g., Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 Fed. App’x. 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007). 
But see Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (no 
per se rule that leave of indefinite duration could never be reasonable accommodation); 
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the employer can treat any additional leave as an unreasonable accommodation. For 
example, even where an employee’s attendance fell within the parameters of an 
employer’s leave policy, a manufacturing plant could treat a request for one 
additional week of leave as unreasonable.120 This employer could assume that the 
plaintiff was “unable to regularly attend his job” after he had taken seventy weeks of 
leave over a three year period; therefore, any additional leave would be “an 
ineffectual gesture.”121 The court sought to protect the employer against any future 
uncertainty: “[T]he employer never knows when the employee’s medical leave will 
really terminate since the employee is likely to request yet another leave shortly after 
returning to work following the previous leave,” allowing the employer to 
“compensate for the missing employee’s frequent, yet unpredictable absences.”122 
Like courts adopting a leave “cut off,” courts also dismiss claims for leave as an 
accommodation based on plaintiffs’ irregular or unscheduled use of leave.123 Courts 
take the position that these unscheduled absences need not be tolerated as an 
accommodation, even for only a few days of work.124 Even the EEOC’s 
Enforcement Guidelines indicate that an employer need not necessarily tolerate 
frequent and unpredictable absences as an accommodation, if those absences impose 
a strain on the employer’s operations.125 This strain can be shown by an inability to 
ensure a sufficient number of employees to accomplish the work required, a failure 
to meet work goals or to serve customers/clients adequately, a need to shift work to 
other employees, and/or incurring significant additional costs due to overtime or 
hiring temporary workers126 Similarly, courts have explained that unpredictable 
absences leave an employer unable to rely on its schedule to efficiently run its 
operations.127 
These decisions demonstrate the low threshold that employers must meet in 
many appellate courts to justify the discharge of an employee who is on a 
“significant” period of leave because of his or her disability. In these courts, leave of 
just a few weeks need not be provided even without any showing by the employer 
                                                                                                                                         
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (1st Cir. 2000) (“These are 
difficult, fact intensive, case-by-case analyses, ill-served by per se rules or stereotypes.”). 
 120 Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 121 Id. at 929. 
 122 Id.; see also Teague v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., No. 96-15401, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
7618, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 1997) (use of 7 months of leave indicated inability to return to 
work after any additional leave). 
 123 Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpredictable days off need 
not be accommodated); Wilson v. State Ins. Fund ex rel. Okla., No. 96-6100, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 602, at *6 (10th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997) (frequent, unauthorized, & prolonged absences 
made plaintiff unqualified); Berkey v. Henderson, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (S.D. Iowa 
2000) (burdensome for employer to assign another employee to compensate for unpredictable 
tardiness). 
 124 Fisher v. Vizioncore, Inc., 429 Fed. App’x 613, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 125 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 682 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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that the leave would interfere with its operations or otherwise impose any specific 
costs on the employer. It is also noteworthy that none of these courts considered the 
tenure of the employee with the employer or their specific skills, which would have a 
direct relationship to the indirect costs on the employer due to extending the leave 
compared to retaining the employee for some additional period of time. 
B. Leave Would Not Result in Qualification 
Under the ADA’s requirement that a claimant be otherwise qualified for the 
position in question, employers are expected to provide alterations of the work 
environment that will facilitate performance of the person’s essential work duties.128 
This means that leave may be a reasonable accommodation for an employee who is 
unable to perform his or her essential job duties for a limited period of time.129 Yet 
courts will not require that an employer provide leave as an accommodation if the 
employee cannot provide any assurance that he or she will be able to return anytime 
in the future.130 
Past use of leave has been used by an employer or a court to predict that an 
employee will be unable to return to work even if leave were provided as an 
accommodation, rendering any additional leave unreasonable.131 For example, the 
claim of a municipality employee was dismissed based in large part on her absence 
from 19-56% of her scheduled work time over a period of three years.132 The 
absences forced the employer to change her work schedule and reassign some of her 
work, but the use of leave did not impose any direct costs on the municipality since 
the leave was unpaid after she exhausted her sick and annual leave.133 Without any 
evidence of the specific indirect costs the municipality incurred due to those 
                                                                                                                                         
 128 Schartz et al., supra note 54, at 936. 
 129 See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that leave of additional 2-4 weeks, based on physician’s opinion that symptoms 
would be “short lived,” could be reasonable); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 
1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st 
Cir. 2000). 
 130 See, e.g., Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding 
that plaintiff was unable to assure that he “likely would have been able to work” at the end of 
that period). 
 131 See, e.g., Trujillo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 330 F. App’x 137, 139 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that past use of leave had not improved attendance); Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 
848-49 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claim of employee with 40 absences within 70 days of 
scheduled work after she suffered an injury at work but was expected to return 27 days later); 
Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 F. App’x 485 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that 14 leaves of absence 
over 23 years of employment showed that additional leave would not allow future return to 
work); Vice v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 113 F. App’x 854, 856 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that no additional leave was required beyond 9 months to treat anxiety & depression); 
Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 211-14 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that previous 
leaves had not improved attendance). 
 132 Colon-Fontanez v. Mun. of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 133 Id. at 24. 
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absences, the court dismissed her claim because her past use of leave had not led to 
any improvement in her attendance.134 
Even short periods of leave may be enough to deny further leave as an 
accommodation, based on predictions about the employee’s inability to return to 
work at the end of the leave.135 Under this approach, employees could not show that 
one and two months of leave, respectively, were reasonable.136 An additional month 
of leave was not required for additional addiction treatment where the first treatment 
was unsuccessful, since the employer was only “judged on what it knew at the time 
or could reasonably foresee” at the time of the employee’s discharge.137 Similarly, an 
employee with cancer could not show that he would have been able to return to work 
at the end of an additional two months of leave,138 while the employer was not 
required to show that his additional absence from work would impose any particular 
costs on that large employer.139 Accordingly, courts have dismissed claims of 
employees seeking leave despite their assurances that the leave would enable them to 
work in the future.140 
These decisions demonstrate that employers are free to make assumptions about 
an employee’s future recovery. For example, additional leave was unreasonable for 
an employee who had refused to follow her treatment recommendations in the past, 
based on the employer’s assumption that no accommodation would assist in 
managing her mental illness so as to prevent future absences from work.141 
This approach places the entire burden of producing evidence of an ability to 
return to work on the employee seeking an accommodation. A much more limited 
number of courts require that the employer show that some limited amount of leave 
would not enable the person to return to work.142 This approach prevents an 
employer from relying solely on its assumption that the employee will not be able to 
perform his or her job duties after the leave.143 These courts recognize the reality that 
                                                                                                                                         
 134 Id. at 43; see also Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1460, 1467 (N.D. 
Ga. 1998) (finding 6 weeks of leave unlikely to enable to return to work where plaintiff 
alleged that management style caused stress reaction). 
 135 Evans v. Fed. Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 140 (1st Cir. 1998); Hamm v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 223 F. App’x 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 136 Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508. 
 137 Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508. 
 138 Evans, 133 F.3d at 140 (citing Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 
601 (7th Cir. 1998)); Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508 (citing Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 601); see 
also Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that employee was 
unable to work 46 days in 6 month period as well as 5 months after discharge date); Jovanovic 
v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
employee who missed 24 days in 12 months could not show that he was qualified to meet 
attendance requirements of position). 
 139 Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508. 
 140 Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 926-28 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
employee had taken 18 months of leave). 
 141 Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 F. App’x 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 142 See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue burden). 
 143 Befort, supra note 6, at 461. 
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leave may be necessary to give the employee time to show that, in the future, he or 
she will become able to perform his or her duties again. 
C. Indefinite Leave is Unreasonable 
Employees with disabilities who cannot predict the amount of leave needed find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to establish that any additional leave would be a 
reasonable accommodation. Like the employee who cannot establish that leave will 
ever enable his or her future return to work, this indefiniteness regarding the length 
of leave needed will often doom a request for leave, even if the employee has not 
used significant amounts of leave in the past.144 The EEOC agrees that an employer 
has no obligation to provide leave of an indefinite duration as an accommodation.145 
Even if the leave is deemed reasonable, an employer can establish an undue hardship 
if the indefinite nature of the leave of absence would not allow the employer to plan 
for the employee’s return or permanently fill the position.146 Indefinite leave is 
distinguished by the EEOC from a leave request with an approximate date of return, 
which could be considered reasonable and could be reconsidered if that date changes 
or becomes less definite.147 
Under this approach, courts typically will not require that an employer establish 
that an indefinite period of leave would impose any specific costs or inconvenience 
for that organization.148 Instead, the indefiniteness of the leave request itself makes 
the request for leave unreasonable.149 Like the courts adopting a “cut off” for leave 
usage, these courts profess that an accommodation must enable the employee to 
perform either presently or in the “immediate future,” because any additional 
requirement would place employers in an “untenable business position.”150 
Uncertainty as to a date of return typically obviates the need for an employer to 
show undue hardship. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has explained that 
“employers are not qualified to predict the degree of success of an employee’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 144 See Oestringer v. Dillard Store Servs., Inc., 92 F. App’x 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that employee who had only taken several short absences of 1-2 weeks each and one 
6 week period was not entitled to any additional leave because she did not request specific 
period of additional leave). 
 145 EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING 
PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (Oct. 14, 2008), 
http:www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html. 
 146 EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N, SMALL EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
(Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodation.html. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Befort, supra note 6, at 463. 
 149 See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, The Interaction of the ADA, the FMLA and Workers’ 
Compensation: Why Can’t We Be Friends?, 41 BRANDEIS L. J. 821, 839 (2003); John E. 
Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA? 
Not an Easy Answer; Rather a Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 67, 88 (2009). 
 150 See Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 143 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
prognosis of employee with PTSD was good so leave of 4 months to complete treatment was 
reasonable accommodation); Fogleman v. Greater Hazleton Health Alliance, 122 F. App’x 
581, 585-86 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no evidence that leave would enable her to perform duties 
within reasonable time where no duration given by plaintiff). 
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recovery from an illness or injury.”151 Providing an employee with ADA protection 
during her indefinite period of recovery would burden the employer with “the duty to 
see into the future,” which the court did not see as “the intent of Congress in passing 
the ADA.”152 As a court explained in a claim arising under the Rehabilitation Act, if 
the date of return is not certain, “an employee could conceivably forestall dismissal 
indefinitely.”153 If the request for leave is considered to be indefinite, courts often do 
not go farther to consider the circumstances surrounding the request that would 
affect the burden imposed on the employer. Instead, courts confronted with a request 
for an indefinite amount of leave routinely deny the reasonableness of such an 
accommodation.154 
An indefinite amount of leave may be deemed unreasonable because an employer 
should not be required to assign the work of the person with a disability to someone 
else for an indefinite period of time, rather than filling the position on a permanent 
basis.155 In rejecting the reasonableness of an indefinite amount of leave, one 
appellate court noted that other employees performed the plaintiff’s work during his 
absences but did not explain why unlimited leave was too burdensome for this 
employer, even for an employee who had received favorable yearly evaluations 
despite his previous absences.156 
Appellate courts have consistently put the onus on the employee with a disability 
to provide a specific date of return before an employer is required to provide any 
amount of leave as an accommodation.157 In a 1995 decision often cited for the 
proposition that leave of an indefinite duration is an unreasonable accommodation, 
the Fourth Circuit refused to require that an employer provide leave for an employee 
who sought time off to control his blood sugar and hypertension.158 
                                                                                                                                         
 151 Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 152 Id. at 1049; see also Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 
2009) (finding employee able to work after 6 months treatment for cancer); Crano v. Graphic 
Packaging Corp., 65 F. App’x 705, 708 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that one sentence stating that 
maintaining an employee on indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation). 
 153 Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 154 Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting 9 months 
of leave taken over 14 month period). 
 155 Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that accommodation 
must allow employee to perform job duties in present or immediate future); see also Roddy v. 
City of Villa Rica, 536 F. App'x 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no certain date for police 
officer’s return to work without restrictions). 
 156 Wood, 323 F.3d at 1311. 
 157 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiff did not indicate intention to return to work at any time in the future without 
restructuring of his position); Reed, 218 F.3d at 481 (finding employer not required to retain 
pilot after using all paid and 9 months additional leave); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 
87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of 
expected duration of her impairment as of the date of her termination); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire 
Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff could not represent that he 
likely would have been able to work within a month or two). 
 158 Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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To its credit, the Fourth Circuit did go on to explain why unlimited leave would 
be unreasonable for that particular employer.159 The employee was a driver for the 
county’s transit system, and the court explained that “every business day, there are 
routes to be serviced and passengers to be transported,” so it would be unreasonable 
for the county to keep his position vacant.160 Requiring the employer to hire 
temporary help was found to be an unreasonable requirement, only noting that the 
treatment was not certain of success.161 In addition, the court noted that “requiring 
paid leave in excess of an employee’s scheduled amount would unjustifiably upset 
the employer’s settled budgetary expectations.”162 
Other appellate courts have followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead in rejecting the 
reasonableness of an indefinite amount of leave.163 The Seventh Circuit gave some 
consideration to the employee’s particular duties in determining the reasonableness 
of a request for an indefinite amount of leave, even while noting that “the absence of 
employees is disruptive to any work environment.”164 
In many cases, the Fourth Circuit’s logic regarding indefinite leave requests has 
been adopted without requiring a showing of undue hardship on a particular 
employer.165 These courts have looked for a definite medical opinion indicating 
when the employee will be able to return to work to justify the leave as an 
accommodation. Without such an opinion, the leave request is deemed 
                                                                                                                                         
 159 Id. at 283-84. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 283. 
 163 See Pickens v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing jury 
verdict for plaintiff where he sought leave until he was able to return to work); Mack v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 99-2315, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1012, at *14 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 
2000) (finding that plaintiff’s physician could not predict when he would be able to return to 
work); Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that 18 
months of leave required by employer showed lack of ability to work in future). 
 164 Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
 165 See Lara v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 121 F. App’x 796, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(noting lack of reliable information in hand regarding date of return despite testimony that 
plaintiff needed 3-6 weeks of leave); Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 
2000) (leave request unreasonable without expected duration of impairment, where employee 
thought she could return in 4 months but doctor stated that duration of illnesses were 
unknown); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff gave no 
indication of when he could return after 1 year of leave); Vice v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Okla., 113 F. App’x 854, 856 (10th Cir. 2004) (employee failed to notify employer of when 
she could return during 9 months of leave); Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 
(6th Cir. 2000) (reasserting requirement for individualized analysis but not requiring 
accommodation because even after one year’s paid leave, followed by five months unpaid 
leave, plaintiff’s homeopathic physician only offered the vague possibility of returning in one 
to three more years, and suggested no other work he could do). 
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unreasonable.166 These employees are not given an opportunity to show that their 
absence would not impose an undue hardship on their particular employer.167 
The Tenth Circuit exemplified this approach in its dismissal of a claim on behalf 
of an employee who was diagnosed with cancer and had taken just fifteen days of 
leave, after having taken approved intermittent leave prior to that time.168 The 
employee was not expected to be able to return to work for at least another twenty 
days, and his diagnosis remained unchanged.169 The court explained that whenever 
an employee is “uncertain if or when he will be able to return to work,” a leave of 
absence is unreasonable.170 It is noteworthy that this court based this finding of 
“uncertainty” regarding the plaintiff’s ability to return to work on just two months of 
leave, one of which occurred two years earlier, and its concern that the plaintiff 
could not prove that the impairment itself, the cancer, could not be “resolved” at the 
end of the requested leave.171 
Generally, the lack of qualification for a position resulting from a person’s 
disability must be based on a reliable medical opinion. For example, an employee 
suffering from paranoia raised issues of fact regarding her ability to perform 
essential job duties based on the supportive opinions of two physicians.172 A court 
reviewing a claim that the employee is not otherwise qualified to perform the 
essential duties of his or her position may challenge the reliability of a medical 
opinion that qualification is lacking, but that challenge may raise issues of fact that 
will defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment. Requests for leave as an 
accommodation are typically based on an employee’s medical condition. Such 
medical conditions inherently often carry some amount of uncertainty as to the time 
necessary for treatment and/or recovery. Most courts put the burden of that 
uncertainty on the employee seeking leave as an accommodation.173  
                                                                                                                                         
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Valdez v. McGill, 462 F. App’x 814, No. 11-2051, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2783, at *2-
4, *9-10 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012). 
 169 Id. at *3. 
 170 Id. at *9. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dept. of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 
1999); see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv. Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (no 
direct threat shown where doctor failed to conduct testing of applicant's strength or lifting 
mechanics before finding that she failed pre-employment examination); Quinney v. Swire 
Coca-Cola, USA, No. 2:07-cv-788-PMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42098, at *3-4 (D. Utah 
May 18, 2009) (lack of qualification shown by Medical Review Officer opinion that employee 
should not operate company a vehicle while taking narcotic pain medication). 
 173 See, e.g., Valdez v. McGill, 462 F. App’x 814, 818-19 (10th Cir. 2012) (summary 
judgment for employer even though employee submitted two doctors’ notes regarding 
expected date of return, discharged just 1 day after FMLA expired and 3 weeks before second 
expected date of return); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion 
that employee had good chance of returning after leave was insufficient); Cisneros v. Wilson, 
226 F.3d 1113, 1126 (10th Cir. 2000) (letter from physician stated it was “uncertain” when 
she might be able to return to work and second physician’s letter stated that duration of her 
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Under this approach, employees who need an undetermined amount of additional 
leave face a heavy, if not impossible, burden of production. For example, the Second 
Circuit expected a seventeen-year employee to produce factual information 
regarding his medical condition that did not exist, and consequently approved his 
discharge, based on the expiration of six months of disability leave.174 That court had 
originally remanded the claim because the employee alleged that he only needed two 
additional weeks of leave to obtain a doctor’s release to return to work.175 Yet the 
claim was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment because the employee failed 
to show that “the accommodation would likely result in his return to work” and 
because any further absences would have caused the employer a “business 
hardship.”176 Citing the Fourth Circuit, the court opined that “the employee must 
make a showing that the reasonable accommodation would allow him to do so at or 
around the time at which it is sought.”177 
This employee could not establish even a factual question regarding whether two 
additional weeks of leave would be a reasonable accommodation.178 To survive a 
motion for summary judgment, the court expected that at the time of the request for 
leave, the employee should have provided his employer with “assurance” that the 
accommodation would allow him to perform.179 The court made the factual 
determination to rely on a doctor’s report sent to the employer on the day his leave 
was denied, which stated that it was unlikely that he would be able to return to his 
previous job, and stated that it could take two to three months of recovery before he 
could return to any employment.180 The employee could not avoid summary 
judgment despite a report issued six days later by the same doctor, who stated that he 
“would not be able to return to his job ‘in the foreseeable future’” and stating that he 
was “totally incapable of performing his job.”181 Summary judgment was granted 
despite the court’s conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that this second 
report “did not accurately state whether [the employee] was ‘qualified’ to ‘perform 
the essential functions’ of his job with a reasonable accommodation,” because it was 
prepared in support of his claim for disability benefits.182 This set of decisions 
illustrates the lengths to which some courts will go to grant summary judgment in 
favor of an employer seeking to avoid leave as an accommodation. At least some 
courts demand this very specific level of proof in response to a motion for summary 
judgment to preserve the employee’s claim for a reasonable accommodation. 
                                                                                                                                         
illnesses were “unknown,” even though plaintiff gave expected date of return just 2 months 
after employer refused to extend leave). 
 174 Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 353 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 175 Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 176 Graves, 353 F. App’x at 560. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 560-61. 
 179 Id. at 561. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
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In stark contrast to the heavy burden placed on a plaintiff seeking leave as an 
accommodation by these above-referenced courts, other appellate courts have been 
reluctant to require that an employee provide a specific, firm date for his or her 
return to work.183 These appellate courts have been leery of a per se rule that any 
leave of an indefinite duration is unreasonable.184 Under this approach, the court 
considers the reasonableness of an employee’s request for leave as “a factual 
determination untethered to the defendant employer’s particularized situation.”185 
These courts stress that an individualized assessment must be used to determine 
if the leave would constitute a reasonable accommodation.186 One of these courts 
recognized that even though “[s]ome employees, by the nature of their disability, are 
unable to provide an absolutely assured time for their return to employment,” each 
case must be reviewed individually rather than requiring a definite date of return in 
each situation.187 In this claim, the plaintiff had requested a specific two-month 
period of leave as an accommodation, and the employer failed to show that the 
additional leave would impose an undue hardship.188 Yet even under a more 
individualized approach, the indefiniteness of the employee’s expected date of return 
to work may show the unreasonableness of a request for additional leave, 
particularly if the treating physician cannot give a time frame regarding a return to 
work.189 
Like the approach of these courts, but in contrast to the EEOC’s guidance 
described above, the EEOC’s technical assistance states that leave may be a 
reasonable accommodation even if he or she cannot provide a fixed date of return.190 
At the same time, the EEOC advises that the lack of a fixed return to work date may 
constitute an undue hardship if the employer cannot plan for the employee’s return 
or permanently fill the position.191 The EEOC makes a distinction between an 
indefinite amount of leave, which is unreasonable if it involves situations in which 
an employee can give no indication of if or when he or she will be able to return to 
work, and situations where the employee is able to give an approximate date of 
                                                                                                                                         
 183 See Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006); Humphrey v. Mem’l 
Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (ADA does not require employee to show 
that leave of absence is certain or even likely to be successful to prove that it is a reasonable 
accommodation). 
 184 Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136; Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 
(1st Cir. 2000); Dark, 451 F.3d at 1090 (89 days of sick leave could be reasonable 
accommodation to give employee time to adjust to new medication to control seizures). 
 185 Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 186 Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 647. 
 187 Id. at 648; see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (leave of additional 2-4 weeks, based on her physician’s opinion that the symptoms 
would be “short lived,” could be reasonable). 
 188 Id. at 648-49. 
 189 Walsh, 201 F.3d at 726-27. 
 190 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4. 
 191 Id.  
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return or a range of possible return dates.192 The EEOC does not suggest that an 
employer must grant leave as an accommodation where an employee can give no 
indication of whether he or she will ever be able to return to work.193 
The EEOC’s Guidance on Performance and Misconduct responds to the question 
“Do employers have to grant indefinite leave as a reasonable accommodation to 
employees with disabilities?” with the answer “No . . . they have no obligation to 
provide leave of indefinite duration.”194 This guidance provides inconsistent 
information to both employers and employees seeking leave.195 This inconsistency 
may underlie employers’ criticism of the EEOC’s guidance as providing “very little 
assistance in determining when a request for leave stops being definite and 
reasonable and becomes indefinite and unreasonable.”196 
The per se rule adopted by many appellate courts regarding leave of an indefinite 
duration places a heavy burden on the employee with a disability and his or her 
health care providers to determine with some certainty not only the length of leave 
that is needed, but also the expected duration of the impairment which is causing the 
need for leave. This burden may result in a loss of employment for people with 
disabilities, since no one can predict with “total certainty” the time required for 
future medical treatment and recovery.197 In other appellate courts, professional 
evidence that some additional leave is necessary may be sufficient to demonstrate 
the reasonableness of that leave request, even if neither the employee nor the health 
care provider can predict with certainty when the employee will be able to return.198 
This deference to employers who discharge employees who need an indefinite 
amount of leave gives employers a strong incentive to discharge earlier rather than 
later. As exemplified by the decisions described above,199 an employee is unlikely to 
know a definite date of return shortly after diagnosis or even during treatment. Thus, 
an employer can discharge an employee with a disability at that early stage without 
fear of liability for any failure to accommodate. 
D. Consideration of Leave Policies 
An employer’s leave policies have been considered and sometimes afforded 
controlling weight in determining whether a leave request is reasonable.200 In many 
circumstances where the leave requested exceeds the amount provided by an 
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 193 Kuczynski, supra note 44; East, supra note 14. 
 194 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4. 
 195 East, supra note 14. 
 196 McLaughlin, supra note 10. 
 197 Center, supra note 68. 
 198 See, e.g., Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (leave of additional 2-4 weeks, 
based on her physician’s opinion that the symptoms would be “short lived,” could be 
reasonable). 
 199 Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009); Hudson v. MCI 
Telecomm. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 200 Befort, supra note 6, at 461-62. 
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employer’s policy or even just past practice, the employer is not required to show 
that additional leave would impose an undue hardship.201 Instead, the policy itself is 
enough to establish that the leave requested is unreasonable. At the same time, 
experts have contended that an employer’s policies or practices are not a complete 
defense to the requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.202 In other words, 
even “neutral rules are not sacrosanct.”203 The role of employer policies in 
determining what accommodations are reasonable was addressed by the Supreme 
Court with respect to seniority policies, but the Court’s reasoning may not translate 
well to determine the reasonableness of requests for leave. 
1. Supreme Court Consideration of Employer Policies 
The Supreme Court considered the significance of employer seniority policies in 
determining whether a transfer to another position would be a reasonable 
accommodation, in one of only a few decisions concerning the reasonableness of 
accommodations.204 Under this 2002 decision, an employer’s leave policy is relevant 
but not conclusive as to whether a transfer would be a reasonable accommodation, 
even where another employee may seek that same position under an employer’s 
seniority policy.205 For the reasons outlined below, an employer’s policy regarding 
leave should not be given the same weight as a seniority policy in determining 
whether the amount of leave is reasonable. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the claim of an employee who sought a transfer to 
a position to which another employee was entitled under the employer’s seniority 
policy and concluded that an employer’s seniority system was entitled to a 
presumption of deference to support a conclusion that the transfer was an 
unreasonable accommodation.206 At the same time, the Court also recognized that 
accommodation sometimes requires differential treatment207 and therefore refused to 
find that an employer’s neutral policy created an automatic exemption from any 
requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.208 Such an automatic exemption 
would not allow the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision to accomplish its 
intended objective.209 
The Court reasoned that an employer’s seniority policy may justify the denial of 
an accommodation based on “the importance of seniority to employee-management 
relations.”210 Seniority systems have been given special consideration under all non-
                                                                                                                                         
 201 See infra notes 228-58 and accompanying text. 
 202 Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
1119, 1152 (2010). 
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 204 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002). 
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 206 Id. at 397. 
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 209 Id. at 397. 
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discrimination statutes because the typical seniority system creates and fulfills 
employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.211 To require an employer to prove 
undue hardship, rather than just the existence of a seniority system, could undermine 
those expectations as well as a seniority system as a whole.212 
This respect for seniority systems should not give employers’ leave policies the 
same influence in determining whether leave is a reasonable accommodation. 
Overall, a broad application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning to other employer 
policies could lead to the discharge of productive employees with disabilities.213 In 
fact, the Court’s reasoning regarding seniority systems has been criticized since it 
does not consider the costs of failing to provide an accommodation, including the 
departure costs associated with losing the employee with a disability who cannot 
remain employed without the accommodation.214 
In addition, nondiscrimination statutes and decisions interpreting the ADA have 
not recognized an employer’s right to determine an appropriate amount of leave, in 
contrast to their specific deference to seniority policies.215 Moreover, unlike 
seniority, leave policies are not closely tied to employment relations or employment 
decisions such as reassignment or promotion, and do not represent a system of 
“delayed benefits” as does a seniority system. 
More specifically, the Court’s deference to seniority policies should not be 
directly applied to accommodation requests for leave that exceed the amount of 
leave provided under an employer’s policies because the interests created or 
protected by a seniority policy are much more distinct than any coworkers’ interests 
affected by extension of leave as an accommodation beyond what is required under 
an employer’s policy. In respecting an employer’s seniority policy, the Court 
specifically aimed to protect the particular coworker interests in enforcement of a 
seniority policy, based on the expectations created by such a policy.216 Since leave 
would not trample on such clearly defined interests of other employees, the 
deference to seniority policies shown by the Supreme Court should not necessarily 
be extended to other employer policies.217 
                                                                                                                                         
 211 Id. at 404. At least one expert has suggested that an employer should be required to 
present evidence of loss, such as damage to co-workers’ expectations under a seniority 
system, since the employer alone has this information. Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 
171. 
 212 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404-05. 
 213 Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled 
Employees and their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 313, 324 (2007); see also Anderson, 
Neutral Policies, supra note 40, at 35-36.  
 214 Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 183-84. These costs include the disabled 
employee’s loss of his investments in skills and knowledge specific to that employer and the 
remaining dividends from his sunk investments/delayed dividends contract, while facing the 
prospect of lower wages and uncertain employment prospects in the external labor market. Id. 
at 189. 
 215 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403. 
 216 Id. at 403-05. 
 217 Weber, supra note 202, at 1164. 
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Even though it could be argued that other employees may be required to perform 
extra work if a coworker’s leave is extended, that interest is much less distinct than a 
coworker who expects to benefit from his or her seniority. Rather, leave as an 
accommodation may not greatly interfere with the interests of other employees.218 
When one employee takes leave, a coworker may experience at most minimal 
adverse consequences, particularly where work can be distributed among several 
employees, compared to the harm to a coworker losing out on a transfer to which he 
or she is entitled based on seniority. In addition, any effects on coworkers caused by 
leave taken by an employee with a disability can be minimized by the employer 
much easier than the effects of ignoring rights existing under a seniority system.219 
Seniority policies are also worthy of greater deference than employer leave 
policies because a seniority system is typically well publicized and understood by all 
affected employees.220 In contrast, an employer’s leave may be granted on an ad hoc 
basis. In fact, any policies can and should be read so as to imply an exception for 
accommodations. Leave policies can be seen as providing a floor above which an 
employer has promised to stay, rather than a ceiling on benefits to be provided to 
employees. Leave policies generally apply to all employees, not just those with 
disabilities, including those who may be using leave for a variety of reasons that 
provide no benefit to the employer. Since the ADA does require that employers 
provide different accommodations based on employees’ disabilities, it may not be 
unreasonable to expect employers to vary from leave policies, particularly if the 
employer cannot show that such a variation would impose an undue hardship. 
Lastly, leave policies are not worthy of as much deference as seniority systems 
because of the strong connection between use of leave and an employee’s disability. 
An exception to an employer’s leave policy is often sought because of limitations 
imposed by the person’s disability.221 Therefore, a blanket policy of discharging 
employees after a certain period of leave screens out or tends to screen out 
individuals with disabilities at a disproportionate rate compared to other employees. 
Since uniformly applied leave policies are not subject to challenge under disparate 
impact theory,222 it is particularly important for employees to be able to request a 
variation from such a leave policy as an accommodation. 
The impact of employer’s leave policies on reasonable accommodation 
determinations should also be limited by the Supreme Court’s reluctance to give 
absolute deference to an employer’s seniority policy. Under its decision, an 
employee can still show that a transfer is a reasonable accommodation even though it 
conflicts with an employer’s seniority system, if “special circumstances” alter the 
expectations of other employees under that seniority system.223 These circumstances 
include an employer’s past exceptions to that policy, or different application of that 
                                                                                                                                         
 218 Porter, supra note 213, at 355. 
 219 Id. at 359. 
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policy to other employees.224 Under these circumstances, the employee with a 
disability could show that such a policy should not be used to establish the 
unreasonableness or even the undue hardship caused by his or her use of leave.225 
This consideration of “special circumstances” demonstrates that if a policy is not 
enforced consistently, then it may not be sufficient basis for denying a particular 
accommodation. Therefore, the emphasis in reviewing requests for leave that goes 
beyond an employer’s policies should focus on whether that employer has made 
exceptions for other employees without disabilities.226 Courts should also consider 
whether a greater burden is being placed on employees with disabilities who are 
seeking leave compared to other employees whose requests for leave are granted 
without the concrete medical evidence that is often required to justify leave as an 
accommodation.227 
For these reasons, appellate courts should not give unlimited deference to 
employers who rely on their own policies in denying leave as an accommodation. 
Instead, both the past application of that policy and the individual circumstances 
surrounding the request for leave should be considered under the Supreme Court’s 
guidance. 
2. Courts’ Deference to Leave Policies 
Appellate courts have taken two distinct approaches when considering the 
reasonableness of leave that exceeds an employer’s policies. In line with an equal 
treatment approach, several appellate courts have consistently given deference to an 
employer’s policies as the upper limit on how much leave is reasonable.228 This 
deference gives considerable flexibility to employers who have developed policies 
for all employees, without requiring that those employers justify those policies by 
establishing undue hardship in the face of a claim for reasonable accommodation. A 
second, smaller group of appellate courts do not give complete deference to an 
employer’s leave policies in determining the reasonableness and undue hardship 
caused by a leave request; instead, those courts focused on whether a variance from 
that policy would negatively affect the employer.229 
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 226 Petesch, supra note 11. 
 227 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussion of evidence required to 
justify leave requests).  
 228 See Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir. 
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 229 See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text. 
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In many decisions, a leave request has been deemed unreasonable because it 
exceeds the amount of leave allowed under the employer’s policies.230 Such 
deference to an employer’s policies allows employers to define the amount of leave 
that is reasonable as an accommodation. In addition, many of these courts have not 
considered how the leave policy has been applied or interpreted in the past, 231 
despite the importance of these factors recognized by the Supreme Court.232 Such 
blind deference to employer’s policies undermines an employee’s ability to show 
that he or she is being treated less preferentially than other employees, even those 
without disabilities. 
This deference to employer’s policies foregoes courts’ statutory obligation under 
the ADA to consider whether leave as an accommodation in a particular situation 
would place an undue hardship on the employer. Consequently, courts and 
employers are not considering the relative costs associated with keeping the position 
open for an employee with a disability who may be difficult to replace because of his 
or her tenure with that employer and the skills and abilities held by that employee. 
In these policy-deferential courts, employees have not been successful in using 
leave policies or past practices to establish the reasonableness of their requests for 
leave that is allowed under those policies.233 The Fourth Circuit explained that leave 
is not necessarily reasonable even if it is required by an employer’s policy, which 
“are not the definitive source of the standard by which reasonable accommodation is 
measured under federal law.”234 These courts have not addressed the significant 
policy considerations which were relied upon by the Supreme Court in giving 
considerable deference to an employer’s seniority policy which do not apply to a 
leave policy, as discussed above.235 
If an employer does not have a set policy in place, a past practice of allowing 
unpaid absences does not necessarily establish that future leave is a reasonable 
accommodation. 236 The Third Circuit held, for example, that an obese employee 
failed to show that an additional four days of unpaid leave would be a reasonable 
accommodation, even though the employer had granted past leave to her in excess of 
its eighteen days of paid sick leave per year.237 Any additional leave would have 
created an undue burden for this employer where it had already granted her extensive 
unpaid leave in the past.238 The court was not influenced by the employer’s policy of 
                                                                                                                                         
 230 See infra cases at note 241. 
 231 See, e.g., Colón-Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 43-44 (1st Cir. 
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allowing up to six months on leave without pay.239 Note that the court used the 
“undue burden” language, but the only burden shown by this employer was the 
amount of leave previously taken by this employee.240 
These decisions show that employers can often take advantage of an established 
leave policy to establish that leave that exceeds that policy allotment would be 
unreasonable. At the same time, an employee who seeks leave allowed by an 
employer’s policy may not be able to show that the leave is required as an 
accommodation, if the court finds that the amount of leave already used or the timing 
of the leave would be unreasonable for the employer to tolerate. 
In contrast to these policy—deferential courts, the EEOC and some appellate 
courts are more reluctant to use an employer’s leave policy as the benchmark for 
reasonableness. Some courts have refused to find that leave is an unreasonable 
accommodation even if it would not be required under an employer’s policy.241 In 
these courts, employers are required to show that leave beyond the requirements of 
their policies would impose an undue hardship.242 
Under such a fact-specific, individualized approach, some courts “weigh the risks 
and alternatives, including possible hardships on the employer, to determine whether 
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reasonableness of the 
accommodation.”243 The First Circuit, for example, has held that an employer cannot 
justify a discharge solely because the employee had used all leave available under 
the employer’s policy.244 That employer had a policy of reserving a job for one year 
when employees had been out on short-term disability and had discharged the 
plaintiff after her one-year reservation period ended.245 The court made it clear that 
the ADA can require an employer to grant an accommodation beyond the leave 
allowed under the company’s own leave policy.246 
The limited deference to leave policies shown by these courts is consistent with 
the legislative history of the ADA, which demonstrates that variation from a neutral 
employer rule or policy could be required as an accommodation.247 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 239 Id.; see also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (2 
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Salary Continuation Program). 
 240 Id. at 670-71. 
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EEOC takes the position that if an employee needs leave which exceeds the amount 
of leave allowed under an employer’s “no fault” leave policy, “the employer must 
modify its ‘no fault’ leave policy to provide the employee with additional leave,” 
unless the employer can show that another effective accommodation would enable 
the performance of the essential functions of the employee’s position, or additional 
leave would impose an undue hardship.248  
Under this guidance, the EEOC recently has settled class action claims against an 
increasing number of large employers, including both Sears Roebuck ($6.2 million) 
and Supervalu supermarkets ($3.2 million), based on claims that those employers 
automatically discharged employees who were unable to return to work when their 
leave “expired” under the employers’ policies.249 The EEOC explained that both 
employers failed to engage in an individualized analysis or the interactive process 
required by the ADA.250 The EEOC has taken the position that “(1) an inflexible 
leave period, even if it provides a substantial amount of leave, is not sufficient; and 
(2) individualized analysis on leave accommodations is needed, even with a 
generous policy.”251 These guidelines have been criticized as failing to define the 
scope of the requirement to modify an employer’s leave policy.252 Given such 
potential liability and the lack of clarity in the EEOC’s guidance, employer 
representatives have called for more detailed and defined examples of situations 
where maximum leave policies are called into question and provide examples of 
times when additional leave will be deemed necessary and when it will not.253 
Some courts are more willing to find that leave which exceeds an employer’s 
policy is reasonable if past practice has allowed or condoned such leave in the past. 
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to defer to policies 
that have not been applied consistently.254 Thus, an employer’s past practice of 
tolerating absences can establish the reasonableness of tolerating such attendance as 
an accommodation in certain courts. For example, the Third Circuit has twice 
considered an employer’s own application of its leave policy.255 In one case, the 
court refused to conclude that the employee’s attendance had “significantly impacted 
her performance” given the employer’s own positive reviews of her performance and 
the five year tolerance of her absences.256 In a second claim, the court focused on the 
consistency of the employer’s application of its attendance policies with respect to 
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non-disabled employees, and the employer’s adherence to its progressive discipline 
policy.257 At the same time, consistent application of an employer’s policy helps 
establish that leave in excess of that policy would be unreasonable or impose an 
undue hardship.258 
These courts are willing to consider the reasonableness of leave as an 
accommodation separate from the employer’s interpretation of what leave would be 
reasonable for all of its employees. Yet most of the appellate courts, as outlined 
above, give deference to an employer’s leave policies as evidence of what leave 
would be reasonable, especially if that policy has been applied consistently to 
employees without disabilities. This deference gives considerable discretion to 
employers to set leave policies that fit with their overall needs without much fear 
that the ADA will be interpreted to require additional leave. 
E. Legal Requirements and Reasonableness 
Employers that meet their legal requirements for granting leave may be able to 
establish the reasonableness of denying any additional leave as an accommodation. 
Generally, an employee who takes leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) is only entitled to restoration in the same or an equivalent position if by end 
of the FMLA leave period, the employee is able to perform the essential functions of 
the job.259 Yet an employee who has exhausted his or her FMLA leave may still be 
able to show that he or she is entitled to accommodations under the ADA, including 
additional leave.260 
Despite this distinct duty to accommodate, many employers discharge employees 
who have exhausted their FMLA leave without providing any additional leave as an 
accommodation under the ADA.261 In many circuits, these employers have not been 
required to accommodate by extending additional leave beyond the leave required by 
the FMLA as an accommodation.262 For some appellate courts, the provision of 
                                                                                                                                         
 257 Miller, 350 F. App’x at 729; see also Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 851-
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(5th Cir. 2000) (helicopter pilot unable to return to work at end of leave); Orta-Castro v. 
Merck Sharpe & Dohme Quimica P.R. Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 262 See, e.g., Orta-Castro, 447 F.3d at 112 (employee granted leave required by Puerto 
Rican law). 
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leave under federal or state standards is enough to satisfy the duty to accommodate. 
263 The Fifth Circuit, for example, dismissed a claim of an employee because she 
could not show that she could perform the essential duties of her position either 
while she was on FMLA leave or on the day she was discharged, which was the final 
day of that leave.264 Similarly, in denying a claim for leave beyond FMLA 
requirements, the Seventh Circuit explained that coverage of absences by the FMLA 
was “irrelevant” in determining whether the leave was a reasonable accommodation, 
because the ADA only applies to someone who can perform the job.265 This 
approach directly nullifies the right to leave as an accommodation as well as an 
employee’s rights under the FMLA.266  
This deference to an employer’s compliance with the FMLA or other leave 
requirements ignores the substantial policy reasons for providing reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA in addition to the FMLA’s leave requirements. The 
FMLA itself recognizes that “[n]othing in this Act or any amendment made by this 
Act shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or retaining leave 
policies more generous than any policies that comply with the requirements under 
this Act.”267 
There are several reasons why the FMLA should not be seen as the upper limit 
on leave provided as an accommodation. First, FMLA leave is available to any 
employees who meet the service requirements and can show a qualifying event, 
regardless of whether or not they are a person with a disability.268 Therefore, the 
concerns about discrimination and job retention that support the reasonable 
accommodation requirement do not necessarily apply to employees asserting FMLA 
rights.269 
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Second, the FMLA requires no more than twelve weeks of leave based on an 
employee’s own health condition.270 Twelve weeks may be insufficient time to 
enable an employee with a disability to receive treatment or recover from a 
significant injury or illness, such as cancer. Yet after a relatively short and possibly 
even certain time beyond the twelve weeks, that employee could return to his or her 
previous position without causing the employer undue hardship. 
Third, the FMLA does not require accommodations.271 Therefore, if an employer 
can discharge an employee at the end of his or her FMLA leave, without considering 
extension of that leave as an accommodation, then the employee foregoes the 
opportunity to seek other accommodations at the end of his or her accommodation 
leave which could enable the return to work. For example, with an additional two 
weeks of leave beyond her FMLA leave, an employee may be able to return to work 
if she is also provided with periodic breaks or a flexible schedule. 
Courts have failed to recognize that leave as an accommodation may exceed the 
amount of leave available under the FMLA. Instead, many courts conflate the two 
obligations, while only a few make a separate determination regarding the 
reasonableness of the leave request. 
F. Undue Hardship Caused by Leave 
Thus far we have seen the significant evidence that many courts require for a 
plaintiff employee to show that leave is a reasonable accommodation. Even if a 
request for leave is considered to be a reasonable accommodation, an employer can 
still avoid the obligation to accommodation if that accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship. When considering whether an accommodation imposes an undue 
hardship, the ADA requires that courts consider various factors, including cost, the 
effect on an employer’s operations, the overall financial resources and size of the 
employer, and the type of operation involved.272 These factors should be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis.273 
It is noteworthy that these factors provided by the EEOC do not include any 
effect of the accommodation on other employees.274 Some have argued that effects 
on other employees should be compared to the benefit provided by the 
accommodation to the employee with a disability, and this factor should only be 
considered if the accommodation would result in the discharge of another 
employee.275 
                                                                                                                                         
 270 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West 2014). 
 271 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2014); Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 272 42 U.S.C.A. §12111(10)(B) (West 2014). 
 273 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002); see also Morton v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds 
sub nom. by Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(“Undue hardship analysis is thus a fact-intensive inquiry, rarely suitable for resolution on 
summary judgment.”); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(en banc) (“[D]efinition [of undue hardship] by necessity requires a case-by-case analysis.”); 
Petesch, supra note 11. 
 274 Porter, supra note 213, at 326. 
 275 Id. at 335-36. 
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As evidenced by the employer-specific statutory factors, the determination of 
whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship should be based on specific 
facts regarding the individual employee making the request as well as the 
organization where he or she works.276 This makes the undue hardship determination 
particularly appropriate for juries, rather than motions for summary judgment.277 
Leaving these factual questions to a jury makes sense since “members of the 
community will collectively be much more familiar with the modern workplace than 
a judge whose non-legal work experience may have come decades earlier.”278 
Many dismissals of claims seeking leave as an accommodation do not reach the 
question of undue hardship because the court determines that the accommodation is 
unreasonable.279 In only limited circumstances have appellate courts denied 
summary judgment for employers in claims for accommodation based on the 
absence of tangible costs associated with employees’ use of leave.280 In courts 
following this approach, an employer must show that the leave by the particular 
employee will have a negative effect on that employer, either as part of the 
determination regarding whether the accommodation is reasonable or, more often, as 
part of its undue hardship analysis.281 
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in reviewing a request for leave by one employee 
with lupus, refused to adopt a “bright-line rule defining a maximum duration of 
leave that can constitute a reasonable accommodation,” and instead expected the 
employer to establish that the leave would impose an undue hardship.282 In line with 
the EEOC guidelines, the court considered the type of operation or operations of the 
covered entity, including the difficulty that this employer would have in covering the 
claimant’s duties with another employee at that location.283 The court concluded that 
without evidence regarding the employer’s financial situation, “reasonable jurors 
could find by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a 
verdict.”284 The court also discounted the evidence related to undue hardship based 
on the disparaging statements made by her supervisor regarding the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 276 Weber, supra note 202, at 1151. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 1175; see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 602 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (“Consideration of the degree of excessiveness is a factual issue well suited to a 
jury determination.”). 
 279 See supra notes 100-273 and accompanying text (discussing of grounds for finding 
leave to be an unreasonable accommodation based on the length or indefiniteness of the leave 
or based on employer’s policies or legal obligations). 
 280 See Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 F. App’x. 74, 78 (6th Cir. 2003); Gantt v. 
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Cleveland, 83 F. App’x. at 78. 
 283 Id. at 80; see also Siekaniec v. Columbia Gas Co., 48 F. App’x. 173, 175 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(requiring employer to cover sporadic absences with two on call employees would cause 
undue hardship). 
 284 Cleveland, 83 F. App’x at 80. 
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disability,285 concluding that the supervisor’s “business judgment was clouded by his 
animosity towards individuals who have lupus.”286 This reasoning highlights why it 
is important for courts to look beyond employers’ policies to determine whether a 
specific request for leave would impose a hardship on an employer. 
Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit has required some employers to show that 
the leave requested by an employee with a disability would impose an undue 
hardship.287 For example, an IBM employee was able to enforce a jury verdict in her 
favor based in part on IBM’s provision of fifty-two weeks of paid disability leave to 
all employees.288 This circuit has at least twice recognized that leave did not 
financially burden an employer because a permanent replacement was not necessary, 
noting that “it was always more profitable to allow an employee time to recover than 
to hire and train a new employee.”289 For example, a claim was upheld where one 
plaintiff’s temporary replacement was being paid no more than the plaintiff, and 
there was no evidence that the temporary replacement was less effective at her job.290 
In line with the EEOC Guidelines, the resources of the employer are sometimes 
considered in determining whether the leave requested would impose an undue 
hardship.291 For example, an employer with fifty to sixty thousand employees 
worldwide could not show an undue hardship where the employer did not replace the 
plaintiff while he was on leave and other employees covered for him.292 Similarly, 
Time Warner was unable to show undue hardship where the plaintiff’s position 
remained vacant approximately six months after her discharge and Time Warner’s 
policy allowed for leave while the employee was on short or long term disability.293 
At the same time, individualized consideration of undue hardship may work in favor 
of an employer with limited resources or a need for a particular level of staffing.294 
Regardless of which side is favored, consideration of undue hardship analysis is 
unusual. Instead, most appellate courts favor the cleaner, seemingly more 
                                                                                                                                         
 285 Id. 
 286 Id.; see also Brenneman v. MedCentral Health, 366 F.3d 412, 416, 418-19 (6th Cir. 
2004) (employee’s absences “placed a great strain on the department” by requiring employer 
to call in another employee or reassign her duties). 
 287 Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 288 Id. at 444. 
 289 Id.; see also Garcia-Ayala v. Lederele Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648 (1st Cir. 
2000) (temporary employee used to replace plaintiff and no need to permanently replace her). 
 290 Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 649. 
 291 Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998); Haschmann 
v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 292 Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1335. 
 293 Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 597, 602. 
 294 See Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (six month leave 
of absence was unreasonable for a police officer for a small municipality which could not 
reallocate that employee's job duties among its small staff); Samper v. Providence St. Vincent 
Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment granted for employer 
which had difficulty replacing specially trained nurse on irregular basis and understaffing 
compromised patient care). 
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“objective” approach focusing on the reasonableness of the accommodation. To the 
employees’ detriment, this approach does not require that the employer establish any 
actual harm caused by the accommodation. If the amount of leave needed is 
indefinite or has exceeded the amount available under the employer’s policies at the 
time of the employee’s discharge, then any additional leave can be deemed 
unreasonable and the employee’s discharge can be deemed nondiscriminatory. 
This approach provides two significant incentives for employers of persons with 
disabilities. First, employers are encouraged to discharge an employee early in the 
course of their recovery or treatment, before the employee has enough medical 
information to predict when he or she can return to work. This timing makes the 
employee’s need for leave indefinite, and therefore the discharge without providing 
additional leave can be justified. 
Second, employers are encouraged to provide little or no leave in their policies 
and to deny leave as a matter of practice. By doing so, the employer is better 
positioned to argue that leave as an accommodation would be unreasonable. This 
incentive may cause employers to disregard the factors that might otherwise support 
more generous leave policies, such as the recruitment and training costs associated 
with replacing valuable employees. Instead, employers may deny leave requests of 
valuable employees for fear of creating a “policy” of providing leave. 
In addition, as the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit highlights, the failure to require 
individualized assessment of the undue hardship caused by leave as an 
accommodation allows employers to rely on broad assumptions about the overall 
costs of absenteeism to deny requests for leave from employees with disabilities. 
Instead of considering the costs versus the benefits of providing leave, employers 
often discharge the employee with a disability. 
III. ANALYSIS OF TWENTY YEARS OF DECISIONS 
Federal opinions addressing requests for leave as an accommodation have been 
reviewed to determine how trial courts are applying the different approaches of 
appellate courts outlined above. Decisions of district and appellate court opinions 
reviewing requests for leave as an accommodation since the passage of the ADA 
have been analyzed to determine whether courts follow any detectable pattern in 
allowing or dismissing these claims for accommodation. 
First, decisions are reviewed to determine whether the leave request was deemed 
unreasonable because it was of the amount of leave that had been used previously or 
the request was for an indefinite length of leave. Decisions are also specifically 
analyzed as to whether a medical opinion was considered and if so, whether that 
medical opinion was deemed to be sufficiently definite regarding the employee’s 
ability to return to work. 
Second, the impact of an employer’s leave policy or FMLA obligations is 
determined by reviewing whether policies or the FMLA were considered by the 
court, and whether or not the requested leave would exceed the amount of leave 
allowed by that employer’s policies or required under the FMLA. Lastly, the 
individual characteristics of the employee requesting leave, including the nature of 
their impairment, job tenure, job classification, and employer industry classification, 
are considered to determine whether more “valuable” employees tend to be more 
able to show that their leave request is reasonable or imposes less of a burden, with 
value being measure by tenure with the employer and level of position or skills. 
Decisions are also reviewed for consideration of the individual job requirements or 
duties that would show the undue hardship imposed by leave as an accommodation. 
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A. The Data 
The data for analysis consist of all three hundred and fifty-three disability claim 
appellate decisions in federal courts since the ADA came into effect in 1992 through 
December 2012, including seventy-seven appellate court decisions and two hundred 
and seventy-six district court decisions. The data are considered complete for the 
identified time frame. These decisions were included in the analysis because an 
employee’s request for leave as an accommodation was denied by the employer and 
the court’s decision addressed whether that leave would have been a reasonable 
accommodation or not. Judgment was entered in favor of the employer in 68.8% of 
the district court opinions and in 85.7% of the appellate court opinions. 
Although the data were collected on court decisions, the unit of analysis can be 
considered to be the individual plaintiff. Accordingly, the analysis includes a number 
of demographic and case detail parameters including type of impairment, years of 
service, type of employer, and position skill level. In addition to corresponding 
outcomes and court-recorded details, the data included details on both the plaintiffs 
and the defendants gleaned from the court documents. Related to the request for 
accommodation, the analysis includes the amount of prior leave taken (in weeks), 
whether the amount of leave requested as an accommodation was fixed or indefinite, 
whether FMLA obligations and employer leave policies were considered, whether 
the amount of leave exceeded that allowed by the employer’s policy (if any), and 
whether health care provider input was considered by the court. A full list of raw 
variables and descriptions appears in Appendix Table 1. 
There is no uniform data collection requirement for ADA cases beyond what is 
necessary for the documentation of the claim. As such, a good number of the 
observations were missing one or more of the far ranging data fields. In fact, of the 
entire set, with each observation having fifty or more fields, only some sixty-five 
cases included every possible field collected. In order for the data set to lend itself to 
regression modeling, a missing data strategy was called for. The strategy utilized in 
this analysis was to utilize separate categories for missing data as needed—this 
permitted full incorporation of all observations with incomplete fields. This allows 
for the inclusion of the maximum number of observations while not discarding 
valuable observations that might be missing only a small portion of the fifty or more 
fields of interest. 
B. Statistical Model 
A logistic model is employed to examine the statistical connection between the 
outcome variable, motions for summary judgment finding that the requested leave 
was or was not a reasonable accommodation, and the explanatory variables. We 
defined the key outcome of interest as Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ). This 
binary variable represents whether requested leave is deemed as reasonable 
accommodation or not, with zero representing a ruling favorable to the plaintiff 
(employee) and one, indicating a finding for the defendant (employer). Unknown 
values (as noted above) were given an additional category within each variable 
where they occurred. It was important to fully utilize all observations, as the 
observations for which court documents did not permit definition of certain 
characteristics were nonetheless informative. N.B., only categorical variables appear 
in this model as specified. The full logistic regression results and variables appear in 
Appendix Table 2. 
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C. Analysis 
Overall, employees seeking leave as an accommodation succeeded in surviving a 
motion for summary judgment in 27.2% of the claims reviewed. As can be seen from 
Table 1, in the two hundred and seventy-six trial court opinions, the employer 
prevailed in one hundred and ninety of two hundred and seventy-six cases (68.8% of 
the time), and in the seventy-seven appellate court decisions, the employer prevailed 
in seventy-two of eighty-three cases (86.7% of the time). Outcomes were 
differentiated based on whether decisions occurred either before or after the Supreme 
Court’s 2002 Barnett decision,295 to determine if the Court’s consideration of 
reasonableness of accommodations had any effect. Outcomes showed similar 
percentages of successful motions for summary judgment for the employer in the 
pre- and post- April 2002 periods, 74.8% and 71.7%, respectively, and the regression 
results showed that the Barnett decision was not a significant factor influencing 
whether or not leave was deemed reasonable. 
There was a wide variation in the treatment of cases depending on the Circuit 
Court in which the claims arose, ranging from courts in the Ninth Circuit finding for 
employers 48% of the time and the First Circuit with 50%, contrasted against courts 
in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, which decided in favor of employers in 96.8% 
and 100% of cases, respectively. The number of cases handled varied, as would the 
types of cases. The significance of circuit court identified by the logit regression 
model ranges from p≤0.002 in the case of the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts to 
almost one, as in the case of the Eleventh and D.C. Circuit Courts. This suggests that 
the variety of approaches to these types of claims across different circuit courts, as 
described in the previous section, may be having a significant impact on employees’ 
success in obtaining leave as an accommodation. 
Decisions were analyzed to determine the impact of individual employee and 
employer characteristics on the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation. It is 
important to note that court decisions did not discuss any of these factors (years of 
service, professional skill level or industry category) in determining the 
reasonableness of a request for leave. These factors were analyzed to determine if 
those factors may be having an unstated effect on those determinations. 
Years of service had a significant effect on court decisions. Years of service was 
divided into three categories: 0-4 years, 5-15 years, and over 15 years. With 0-4 
years as the reference, the 5-15 years of service category proved to be the most 
significant in favor of the plaintiff, while those with over 15 years found favorable 
outcomes less likely, when compared to employees with less than five years of 
experience. The corresponding p-values were 0.043 and 0.307, respectively. This 
suggests that some value may be placed on employees who have undergone on the 
job training or acquired job-related expertise compared to newer employees, while 
the oldest employees may be seen as less likely to be able to return to work.  
There was some variation in outcome based on the professional skill level of the 
employee. In the sample, 25.2% of the plaintiffs were unskilled workers, 31.7% were 
semi-skilled workers, 15% skilled, and 21% professionals. Compared to unskilled 
workers (the reference category), professional workers were significantly more 
likely to receive a favorable outcome, with a p-value of .047. The skilled and semi-
skilled categories, while trending similarly, were not significant, however.  
                                                                                                                                         
 295 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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The coarse industry classifications outcomes did not appear to vary greatly and 
statistical significance was wanting. Industries were grouped as follows: agriculture-
construction-manufacturing (19.6%); transportation-communication-wholesale-retail 
(22.7%); and finance-real estate-services (41.5%). A combined general category 
accounted for the remaining 16.2%. The greater prevalence of decisions in favor of 
employers was in the transportation-communication-wholesale-retail and the 
agriculture-mining-construction-manufacturing categories, with 77.5% and 75.4% of 
outcomes favorable to employers. The finance-real estate-services category had 
71.2%. The unique general category, added to include court cases that indicated a 
combination of industries involved, had the lowest rate of success for employers 
(64.9%). None of the categories proved to be statically significant. 
The decisions were also analyzed for the effect of the type of impairment(s) 
reported by the plaintiffs. Like the other individual characteristics discussed above, 
none of the decisions analyzed discussed the impact of a particular impairment on 
the determination of reasonableness, beyond discussions of the length of leave 
already used or needed by the employee with that impairment. It is interesting that of 
the cases analyzed, 54.9% involved plaintiffs with multiple impairments, which was 
a significant factor (p=.072) in court decisions finding claims to be unreasonable. 
Fully 78.4% of the rulings in cases involving multiple impairments were in favor of 
the employer.  
A chronic injury, such as a back condition, was identified in 23.2% of the claims 
and was significantly associated with positive outcomes for employers. The 
claimant’s impairment was described as work related in 20.1% of the claims, which 
was associated with positive outcomes for plaintiffs but was not significant. Neither 
the presence of chronic non-life-threatening conditions such as asthma, present in 
42.2% of the claims, nor chronic life-threatening conditions, such as cancer, present 
in 14.2% of the claims, affected outcomes significantly. Although both led to a 
slightly lower rate of decisions for employers (69.8% vs. 75.3% and 68.0% vs. 
73.7%), the effect was not statistically significant in the logistic model. 
It is noteworthy that the presence of multiple disabilities or chronic injury may 
wield a confounding effect over claimant outcomes. Claimants not limited by 
multiple disabilities experienced a significantly higher occurrence of favorable 
outcomes (33.3%) compared to those who had multiple disabilities (21.6%). The 
latter was slightly significant, (p=0.072) in favor of employers. This may be due to 
difficulties in the attribution of the disabilities or, perhaps, a conclusion that the 
several disabilities would be more difficult to surmount. The absence of chronic 
injury, while it did lead to claimant-favorable outcomes (30.7% vs. 15.9%), was 
found to have moderate statistical significance in the logistic regression model. 
(p=0.088)The confounding effect of multiple or chronic injuries seemed to push 
claimant outcomes in the same direction in both cases. Where the court noted 
whether the injury was work-related, this effect was not significant in the model. 
In the 30% of the claims analyzed involving a plaintiff with a mental illness, that 
impairment proved to be a significant factor in decisions favoring the employer 
(p=0.055). In the presence of mental illness, 79.2% of the motions for summary 
judgment were granted for the employer, while 70.0% of cases were decided in favor 
of the employer when mental illness was not established. This effect, similar in 
direction to that of multiple disability (and chronic injury), was somewhat smaller in 
magnitude. 
Personality disorders were present in 16.1% of the cases, while alcohol or drug 
addictions were presented in 2.5% of the claims. None of these impairments favored 
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the plaintiff in the outcomes of court decisions since the results in favor of 
employers happened in 71.9% and 77.8% and respectively, without statistical 
significance.  
Among the personal characteristics, chronic injury and mental illness were the 
only factors to persist statistically in the logistic regression model, all with α<0.10. 
The other items of personal information considered, to include personality disorder 
and alcohol/drug problems, did not persist statistically. Moreover, their impact on 
the raw data was also relatively small. 
Given the focus of appellate court reported decisions on the length of leave being 
taken by an employee with a disability,296 the decisions were analyzed based on how 
much leave a plaintiff had used before the current request for leave as an 
accommodation. In three hundred and thirty-one or more than 92% of the decisions, 
the court noted the amount of leave taken prior to the current accommodation 
request, which was divided in these categories: 0 weeks, 1-12 weeks, 13-52 weeks, 
and more than 52 weeks. Generally, the more leave taken, the more likely the 
employer is to prevail. Consideration of this factor was significant overall in favor of 
employers. Surprisingly, the amount of leave taken was not significant for most of 
these categories. The 1-12 weeks and 13-52 weeks categories were associated with 
results in favor of employers but were not a significant factor. Only the prior use of 
more than 52 weeks of leave was a significant factor in outcomes for employers. 
This suggests that employees who have used a relatively short amount of leave in the 
past may be able to convince a court that additional leave is a reasonable 
accommodation, but the use of more than one year of leave in the past will definitely 
have a negative effect on outcomes for plaintiffs seeking approval of even more 
leave as an accommodation. 
It is interesting that two hundred and twenty-five, or over 63%, of the decisions 
involved a claim for leave as an accommodation without noting or considering the 
amount of additional leave being sought. This is in part because 68.3% of the 
requests were for leave of an indefinite duration, which were treated as lacking an 
amount of leave being sought. In the remaining one hundred and twenty-eight 
decisions that specifically considered the amount of leave requested as an 
accommodation, some of these amounts proved to be more significant than the 
amount of leave used by the plaintiffs in the past. These requests were divided into 
these categories: 0-4 weeks, 5-15 weeks, 16-52 weeks, and 52-500 weeks. 78.6% of 
the cases favored the employer when 5 to 15 weeks of leave were offered as 
accommodation. In the case of plaintiffs with 16 to 52 weeks of leave, 72.4% of the 
decisions favor the employer. And absolutely all the claims seeking more than 52 
weeks of accommodation resulted in negative outcomes for the employees. The 
categories of 5-15 weeks and 16-52 weeks were significantly associated with 
judgments in favor of the employer, with the greatest effect coming from leave of 
more than 52 weeks. As expected, this suggests that employers and courts are more 
reluctant to deem future leave to be reasonable as its length surpasses one year. 
However, the effect of a request for 16-52 weeks of leave was less pronounced than 
a request for 5-15 weeks of leave. 
Given the analysis of these types of claims in the appellate courts, one would 
expect that the definiteness of the amount of leave requested as an accommodation 
as well as the scheduling of a need for leave would both have a positive effect for 
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employees seeking leave as an accommodation.297 Decisions were analyzed based on 
whether the amount of leave sought as an accommodation was of a definite or 
indefinite duration, and whether or not the leave was unscheduled, such as calling in 
the morning of scheduled work. In the sample, 31.7% of the cases included definite 
amount of leaves and 22.7% involved unscheduled leave. In the analysis of the 
cases, a need for a definite amount of leave was positively associated with a decision 
that the leave request was reasonable. When the amount of leave needed was 
indefinite, 78.8% of the cases were decided in favor of the employer, and when they 
were definite, this percentage decreased to 59.8%. In contrast, the use of leave on an 
unscheduled basis was positively associated with judgments for the employer but 
was not a statistically significant factor in the logistic model.  
Decisions were also analyzed regarding the consideration of health care provider 
input supporting the need for leave. Courts considered whether the plaintiff had the 
support of a health care provider to justify the need for leave in one hundred and 
thirteen or 32% of the claims reviewed. When healthcare providers’ input was not 
considered, courts ruled in favor of employers in 72.9% of the cases. If a health care 
provider’s opinion was considered, the determination of reasonableness often turned 
on whether the health care provider was able to provide a definite opinion as to when 
the employee will be able to return to work. Where the opinion of a health care 
provider was considered, courts found this opinion to be sufficiently definite in forty, 
or 35.4% of those cases. Compared to decisions where a health care providers’ 
opinion was not considered, a definite opinion as to an employee’s ability to return 
was significantly favorable to plaintiffs, resulting in judgments for the plaintiffs in 
57.5% of the cases with a p-value of 0.002. In contrast, a finding that the health care 
provider’s opinion was not sufficiently definite was significantly associated with 
outcomes for employers. Employers prevailed in 89% of the claims where the health 
care provider’s opinion was considered but was considered to lack a definite date of 
return, with high statistical significance (p=0.01). 
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the amount leave sought as 
an accommodation would exceed the leave available under the Family & Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) or under an employer’s own leave policy. Employer policies 
were expected to be a significant factor in the determination of whether leave was a 
reasonable accommodation, based on appellate court deference to these policies in 
determining the reasonableness of a leave request.298 Employer policies were a 
significant factor in the determination of whether leave was a reasonable 
accommodation. Of the decisions analyzed, the employer’s leave policy was 
considered in 28.6% of those decisions. The court’s failure to consider an 
employer’s leave policy was a statistically significant factor in decisions finding that 
the leave was reasonable.  
In claims where the employer’s leave policy was considered, the leave sought as 
an accommodation exceeded the leave allowed by the employer’s policy in eighty-
two of the cases, compared to nineteen claims where the leave sought was less than 
allowed by an employer’s policy. Consideration of employer policies on leave was a 
significant factor in favor of the employee for cases in which the policy was not 
exceeded (p=0.007). When the employer’s leave policy was exceeded, consideration 
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of employer policy regarding leave tended to support outcomes in favor of the 
employer, though not significantly.  
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the fact that an employer’s 
satisfaction of leave requirements under the FMLA was a significant factor in 
determining that any additional leave would be an unreasonable accommodation.299 
The employer’s FMLA requirements were only considered in thirty-seven or 10.5% 
of the decisions. The actual outcomes of the claims were not well differentiated—
with 72.5% and 75.7% favorable outcomes for the employer, respectively. Although 
the consideration of FMLA obligations was positively associated with decisions in 
favor of employers, this consideration was not a significant factor. 
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the court considered the 
employee’s individual job duties or other circumstances. Given some courts 
reluctance to consider such individualized factors, it was not surprising that only 
24.9% of the studied cases considered the duties or other individual circumstances. 
Of the decisions where such individual factors were considered, courts found that 
leave as an accommodation was reasonable and required in 43.2% of the claims, 
which was highly significant for the model in outcomes in favor of the plaintiff. 
(p=0.005). Where this factor was not considered, employers were successful in 
defeating accommodation claims in 78% of the claims. 
D. Discussion 
Considered together, we have an interesting combination of results. The central 
theme of these analyses is whether and to what degree policy details and claimant 
parameters affect appellate decisions for disability claims. The additional question of 
whether the Barnett ruling significantly affected appellate decisions, even if not put 
to rest, might now be viewed differently. In our sample, 65.2% of the cases occurred 
before the Barnett decision, but it certainly did not impact outcomes as strongly as 
expected.  
While it is reassuring that some of the explanatory variables did not significantly 
drive decisions in a statistical sense, it is clear that courts do matter, and that is not 
reassuring. Further it is difficult to take the position that the sample size is a problem 
in this case. The number of explanatory variables considered was practically 
exhaustive and as large as the sample size would permit. Among the data that could 
be included in any further follow-up to this work would be expanded demographic 
detail, to include minority status, and possibly a larger time window that would 
permit analysis of changes over time. This would be particularly informative given 
the evolving state of labor and the present market challenges.  
Further, the apparent inclusion of multiple factors in support of the claimant case 
would indicate that the explicit ambiguities of the law that permit consideration of 
undue hardship on the employers might extend to consideration of claimant 
individual circumstances as well. What is clear is that the legal grey zones intended 
to foster economically rational decisions incorporates both employer and claimant 
factors to a significant degree in some cases. 
Lastly, and perhaps the most important result from a policy point of view, we 
found that health care provider input, when considered, did weigh heavily in the 
decisions of the court. Similarly, circumstances in which the leave sought exceeded 
                                                                                                                                         
 299 See supra text accompanying notes 261-73. 
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established employer policies were also differentiated statistically. It would seem 
that both policy and specialized input weigh heavily on the processes of the courts. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
Both employers and employees with disabilities can benefit from clearer 
guidance on how much leave should be provided as a reasonable accommodation, 
and under which circumstances such leave could cause the employer an undue 
hardship. In various current circuit court opinions, the reasoning focuses on the 
amount of leave taken prior to the current request for leave and whether the 
employee expects to return at a specific time in the fairly near future. A minority of 
appellate courts go a bit farther and consider whether the employer’s leave policies 
or perhaps the FMLA would require provision of the requested leave.  
The analysis of trial and appellate court decisions was surprising in that smaller 
amounts of past leave taken by an employee were not significant determinants of 
whether the leave was deemed reasonable under the ADA. Only when the prior use 
of leave exceeded one year did it become significant. Similarly, the fact that prior 
leave usage was unscheduled was not a significant factor in outcomes for employers. 
This suggests that although appellate reasoning often mentions the length of prior 
leave or its unscheduled use as important factors in a reasonableness analysis, courts 
do not necessarily dismiss claims because of these factors. Therefore, employers 
should not deny requests for future leave based on how much leave an employee has 
used in the past or the fact that its use was unscheduled.  
With respect to an employee’s future need for leave, the amount needed appears 
to be significant, but the indefiniteness of the need by itself does not appear to be 
significant. The significance of the specific amount of time needed by the employee 
in the future shows that employers should pay close attention to the amount of leave 
that employees are expected to need. However, a need for a longer amount of leave 
does not necessarily make the request unreasonable. A definite length of time for 
future leave favored plaintiffs but surprisingly, indefiniteness was not a significant 
determinant of whether the leave was reasonable. Therefore, an employee’s inability 
to articulate an exact amount of future leave that is needed should not result in the 
denial of the request for leave. 
Like the length of leave requested, courts’ consideration of health care provider 
input on the length of leave necessary to enable the plaintiff to return was extremely 
influential. Conversely, the unavailability or a court’s failure to consider such 
information worked significantly in favor of employers. If the health care provider 
provided a definite opinion regarding when the employee would be able to return to 
work, the plaintiff was even more likely to be able to show that the leave was 
reasonable. This suggests that employers should request and consider carefully the 
opinion of a treating health care provider before determining whether a leave request 
is reasonable. 
The influence of employer leave policies was a significant result. Courts appear 
to be following the logic of one expert, Stephen Befort, who would allow employers 
to rely on a documented leave policy to justify the denial of leave as an 
accommodation.300 The analysis of ADA decisions since 1992 suggests that courts 
are following this logic: Recognition that a request for leave exceeds an employer’s 
policy favors the employer, while a court’s failure to consider leave policies works 
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significantly in the employee’s favor. If the leave requested exceeds the amount 
provided in an employer’s policy, the employer is even more likely to be able to 
show that the leave is unreasonable. Unfortunately, this approach ignores the 
individualized analysis that is required for accommodation requests under the ADA. 
In addition, this weight on employer’s policies without any examination of how 
these policies have been interpreted or applied in the past fails to apply the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court in Barnett, which warned that policies should not be used to 
avoid the duty to accommodate if they have not been applied consistently in the 
past.301 Even if the employer’s policies are applied consistently, this approach allows 
and even encourages employers to adopt very restrictive leave policies that can then 
be used to show that an employee’s request for leave as accommodation is 
unreasonable. 
With respect to individual employee characteristics, it was encouraging that both 
years of service and profession had a significant effect on determinations of 
reasonableness. Factors such as length of service, professional skill level and 
industry classification, as well as some measure of how difficult the employee would 
be to replace, would be relevant to economists’ determinations of reasonableness and 
hardship. Indeed our analysis of decisions since 1992 shows that some employees’ 
skill levels and experience of 5-15 years in length are significant when considered by 
the court. But it is important to note that while profession was often mentioned by a 
reviewing court, none of the courts discussed this as a determinant factor. Moreover, 
more than 7% of the courts did not even mention the plaintiff’s profession in their 
opinions. Similarly, while length of service was mentioned in 91.5% of the 
decisions, none of the courts explicitly gave experience as the reason for finding that 
leave would be a reasonable accommodation. 
Some other individual circumstances were surprisingly significant. An employee 
with a mental illness, a chronic injury, or multiple impairments is significantly less 
likely to successfully challenge the denial of leave as an accommodation, even 
controlling for possibly related factors such as length of leave used in the past. This 
suggests that preconceived notions about either the effects of such impairments or 
the value of employees with such impairment, or both, have influenced courts’ 
determinations of whether leave for these employees would be a reasonable 
accommodation. This effect also suggests that both employers and reviewing courts 
are making assumptions about employees based on the extent or type of their 
impairments, thereby defeating one of the essential purposes of the ADA. 
The decisions that carefully considered the opinion of a health care provider or 
the individual duties of an employee seeking leave show the significant impact of 
such individualized information on determinations of reasonableness. Unfortunately, 
health care provider input was only considered in less than a third of the decisions, 
and individual duties or other factors were only considered in less than 25% of the 
decisions. Employees seeking leave as an accommodation should present 
information to both their employers and the courts regarding their health care 
provider’s opinion on their future ability to return to work, as well as individual 
work circumstances and potential solutions which would make the leave relatively 
less burdensome. Moreover, employers seeking to fulfill their accommodation 
                                                                                                                                         
 301 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002); see supra text accompanying 
notes 212-14.  
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requirements and courts seeking to fully enforce the ADA should be sure to consider 
such information in making reasonableness and undue hardship determinations. 
In reviewing claims for leave as a reasonable accommodation, courts and the 
EEOC should stress the obligation of employers to consider the individual 
circumstances surrounding accommodation requests. This approach has been 
required by the Supreme Court.302 Moreover, this approach would encourage 
employers to weigh the benefits against the costs of retaining an employee who is 
seeking the accommodation. Such an analysis would not only fulfill the individual 
assessment requirements of the ADA, but would also encourage economically 
rational decisions by employers, including consideration of the costs of hiring and 
training a replacement for the employee who seeks the leave. 
An individual analysis of the reasonableness and the undue hardship posed by a 
request for leave as an accommodation may lead to different interpretations of the 
facts involved. In particular, the reasonableness of a request for leave as an 
accommodation often turns on interpretation of facts such as the effect of the leave 
on the employer’s operations as well as facts which are unknown at the time the 
employer considers the accommodation. One way to approach this dispute over 
factual interpretations would be to apply the logic of the “honest belief” defense, 
which has been relied upon as a defense in other types of discrimination claims. If 
there are issues of fact regarding the basis for an employee’s discharge, the honest 
belief defense allows the employer to avoid liability based on its interpretation of the 
facts known at the time of the discharge.303 
Under the honest belief defense, if an employer relies on particularized facts 
which later turn out to be mistaken, foolish, trivial or baseless, that reliance is not 
discriminatory,304 if the decision was “reasonably informed and considered.”305 The 
Sixth Circuit has explained that it “will not blindly assume that an employer’s 
description of its reasons is honest.”306 Therefore, “[w]hen the employee is able to 
produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a 
reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its adverse employment 
action, thereby making its decisional process ‘unworthy of credence,’ then any 
reliance placed by the employer in such a process cannot be said to be honestly 
held.”307 
This honest belief defense relies on the extent of the employer’s investigation 
showing that the employer made “a reasonably informed and considered 
                                                                                                                                         
 302 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569 (1999); Sutton 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). 
 303 Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (1998). 
 304 Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (at time of discharge, 
employer documentation of substandard performance and poor behavior). 
 305 Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2006) (employer relied on 
information regarding plaintiff’s performance and harassment of coworkers based on 
employee interviews). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 708 (quoting Smith, 155 F.3d at 807-08). 
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decision.”308 For example, an employer showed an honest belief that a Plaintiff was 
unable to perform the physical requirements of her job duties based on reports from 
other employees and employee and health records documenting her inability to 
perform the duties.309  
Under the honest belief defense, the employer has the burden of identifying the 
particularized facts it relied upon in taking an adverse action.310 An employer failed 
to establish a honest belief, for example, when it discharged an employee shortly 
after he was hurt by an accident at work, since the supervisor who discharged him 
did not question him about the incident and the employer could not produce any 
documentation of any investigation of the accident or evidence of the specific facts 
known by the supervisor at the time of the discharge.311 
This same approach could be applied to employers’ consideration of requests for 
leave as an accommodation. If the employer engages in a reasonable investigation of 
the employee’s potential for returning to work and an analysis of the actual costs of 
extending the leave, then the employer should be able to rely on the facts known at 
the time the accommodation is considered. Conversely, if the facts suggest that the 
employee may be able to return to work in a fairly short or definite amount of time, 
or that the costs of replacing that employee may exceed the costs associated with 
extending the leave, then the employer should grant the accommodation. 
This approach is consistent with the proposed requirements in the Working 
Families Flexibility Act, which would require certain procedures before an employer 
responds to a request for leave as an accommodation.312 This Act would require that 
an employer respond to a request for leave with a written decision that explains the 
reason for any denial, including the limitations posed by the resources of the 
employer, the costs posed by the change in terms, potential effects of the change on 
customers, and other managerial concerns.313 
Placement of some burden on the employer to show that leave as an 
accommodation would not be reasonable or imposes an undue hardship is also 
appropriate since a uniform policy against use of leave could well have a disparate 
impact on employees with disabilities. Such a qualification standard that screens out 
or tends to screen out an individual with a disability must be proven by the employer 
                                                                                                                                         
 308 Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard Care, LLC, 692 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (employer 
conducted reasonable investigation into plaintiff’s performance); see also Davis v. City of 
Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2012) (employer investigation into plaintiff’s 
dishonesty was reasonable where investigator was unbiased and interviewed numerous 
witnesses, hearing allowed Plaintiff to present his version). 
 309 MacDonald-Bass v. J.E. Johnson Contracting, Inc., 493 F. App’x 718, 726 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 310 Clay v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2007) (summary 
judgment for employer denied where employer did not show belief was “reasonably based on 
particularized facts”). 
 311 Brooks v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 478 Fed. Appx. 934, 943 (6th Cir. 2012); see also 
Ramey v. Vacument Corp., No. 2:09-CV-196, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9121, at *17 (E.D. 
Tenn. Jan. 26, 2012) (discharge for abuse of sick leave not based on honest belief when based 
on brief observation of plaintiff and timing of doctor’s visits). 
 312 Arnow-Richman, supra note 73, at 1110. 
 313 Id. 
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to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and performance cannot be 
achieved through reasonable accommodation.314 Congress expressed its intention in 
the ADA that an employer can insist upon across-the-board qualification standards 
only if those standards “provide an accurate measure of an applicant’s actual ability 
to perform the job . . . .”315 
Leave as an accommodation is an important tool for admitting and retaining 
employees with disabilities in the workforce. To be an effective tool, however, 
employers and courts cannot continue to deny requests for leave or discharge 
employees who have taken leave that exceeds an individual employer’s policy or 
some abstract notion of how much leave is “too much.” Instead, employers should 
rely on an individual employee’s health care provider as well as factors related to the 
job in question to determine the reasonableness and hardship potentially caused by a 
particular request for leave. Like employers asserting the honest belief defense, 
employers taking such an individualized approach should be able to rely on the 
information available to them. But decisions that will greatly affect an employee’s 
future in the workforce should not be made based on assumptions or a lack of 
information. Such decisions are not economically efficient and should be deemed 
discriminatory.  
  
                                                                                                                                         
 314 29 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(6) (West 2014). 
 315 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465, 
1990 WL 121680. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Appellate Decision Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 270 (76.5) 185 (72.0) 
Yes 83 (23.5) 72 (86.7) 
Circuit Court Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
1 20 (5.7) 10 (50) 
2 32 (9.1) 19 (59.4) 
3 37 (10.5) 22 (59.5) 
4 26 (7.4) 22 (84.6) 
5 29 (8.2) 24 (82.8) 
6 41 (11.6) 27 (65.9) 
7 64 (18.1) 50 (78.1) 
8 31 (8.8) 30 (96.8) 
9 25 (7.1) 12 (48) 
10 28 (7.9) 21 (75) 
11 18 (5.1) 18 (100) 
D.C. 2 (0.6) 2 (100) 
Years of Service Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Zero through four years 117 (33.1) 85 (72.6) 
Five through 15 years 148 (41.9) 102 (68.9) 
Over 15 years 58 (16.4) 47 (81.0) 
Leave Taken before this Request Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Zero 9 (2.5) 5 (55.6) 
1-12 weeks 134 (38.0) 94 (70.1) 
13-52 weeks 141 (39.9) 106 (75.2) 
1 Year and More 47 (13.3) 40 (85.1) 
Weeks of Leave Offered as 
Accommodation 
Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Unknown 225 (63.7) 176 (78.2) 
Zero through four 69 (19.5) 35 (52.2) 
Five through 15 28 (7.9) 22 (78.6) 
16 through 52 29 (8.2) 21 (72.4) 
52 through 500 2 (0.6) 2 (100) 
Professional Skill Level Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Unskilled 89 (25.2) 66 (74.2) 
Semi-Skilled 112 (31.7) 82 (73.2) 
Skilled 53 (15) 42 (79.2) 
Professional 74 (21) 51 (68.9) 
Coarse Groupings of Industry 
Classifications 
Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Combination 57 (16.2) 38 (66.7) 
Ag/Mining/Construction/Manuf 69 (19.6) 52 (75.4) 
Transp/Commun/Wholesale/Retail 80 (22.7) 62 (77.5) 
Finance/Real Estate/Services 146 (41.5) 104 (71.2) 
FMLA Considered? Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 316 (89.5) 229 (72.5) 
Yes 37 (10.5) 28 (75.7) 
Chronic Non-Life Threatening Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 194 (55) 146 (75.3) 
Yes 149 (42.2) 104 (69.8) 
Chronic Life Threatening Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 293 (83) 216 (73.7) 
Yes 50 (14.2) 34 (68.0) 
MULTDISAB Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 156 (45.1) 104 (66.7) 
Yes 190 (54.9) 149 (78.4) 
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Chronic Injury Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 261 (73.9) 181 (69.3) 
Yes 82 (23.2) 69 (84.1) 
Mental Illness Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 237 (67.1) 166 (70.0) 
Yes 106 (30) 84 (79.2) 
Personality Disorder Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 286 (81) 209 (73.1) 
Yes 57 (16.1) 41 (71.9) 
Alcohol/Drugs Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 334 (94.6) 245 (72.8) 
Yes 9 (2.5) 7 (77.8) 
Work Related? Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 273 (77.3) 195 (71.4) 
Yes 71 (20.1) 56 (78.9) 
Post 4-29-02 Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 123 (34.8) 92 (74.8) 
Yes 230 (65.2) 165 (71.7) 
Amount Definite Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 241 (68.3) 190 (78.8) 
Yes 112 (31.7) 67 (59.8) 
Unscheduled Leave Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 273 (77.3) 200 (73.3) 
Yes 80 (22.7) 57 (71.3) 
Individual Circumstances 
Considered 
Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
No 264 (74.8) 206 (78.0) 
Yes 88 (24.9) 50 (56.8) 
Health Care Policy Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Considered Not Sufficiently 
Definite 
73 (20.7) 65 (89.0) 
Considered Sufficiently Definite 40 (11.3) 17 (42.5) 
Not Considered 240 (68.0) 175 (72.9) 
Whether Leave Policy was 
Considered 
Frequency (%) MSJ for ER = 1 (%) 
Leave Exceeded Policy 82 (23.2) 62 (75.6) 
Leave Did Not Exceed Policy 19 (5.4) 7(36.8) 
Not Considered 252 (71.4) 188 (74.6) 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression 
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Appellate decision for ER 2.519 0.635 15.731 1 .000 12.416 3.576 43.108 
Circuit Court (reference 1st)   29.318 11 .002    
2nd Circuit 0.866 0.812 1.137 1 .286 2.377 0.484 11.674 
3rd Circuit .539 0.824 .429 1 .513 1.715 0.341 8.621 
4th Circuit 3.922 1.079 13.218 1 .000 50.504 6.096 418.383 
5th Circuit 2.981 1.025 8.452 1 .004 19.700 2.641 146.937 
6th Circuit 1.698 0.853 3.963 1 .047 5.461 1.027 29.049 
7th Circuit 2.453 0.851 8.311 1 .004 11.619 2.193 61.566 
8th Circuit 5.687 1.797 10.016 1 .002 295.071 8.715 9990.487 
9th Circuit .395 0.917 .185 1 .667 1.484 0.246 8.958 
10th Circuit 1.595 0.952 2.806 1 .094 4.928 0.762 31.852 
11th Circuit 22.210 8091.687 .000 1 .998 4.42E+09 0.000 . 
12th Circuit 22.223 2.77E+04 .000 1 .999 4.48E+09 0.000 . 
Years of Service (reference 0-4)   8.686 3 .034    
5-15 Years -.930 0.459 4.113 1 .043 0.394 0.161 0.969 
Over 15 Years 0.647 0.633 1.044 1 .307 1.909 0.552 6.597 
Leave taken before this request 
(reference 0 weeks) 
  11.880 4 .018    
1-12 Weeks .363 1.137 .102 1 .750 1.437 0.155 13.340 
13-52 Weeks 0.825 1.141 0.523 1 .470 2.283 0.244 21.366 
1 Year and More 2.246 1.336 2.826 1 .093 9.446 0.689 129.503 
Leave offered as accommodation 
(reference 0-4 weeks) 
  17.428 4 .002    
5-15 Weeks 3.005 0.919 10.701 1 .001 20.179 3.335 122.109 
16-52 Weeks 1.916 0.785 5.962 1 .015 6.791 1.459 31.602 
52-500 Weeks 21.991 2.56E+04 0.000 1 .999 3.55E+09 0.000 . 
Professional skill level (reference 
unskilled) 
  8.220 4 .084    
Semi-skilled -0.744 0.549 1.833 1 .176 0.475 0.162 1.395 
Skilled -.577 0.673 0.735 1 .391 0.561 0.150 2.100 
Professional -1.155 0.581 3.958 1 .047 0.315 0.101 0.983 
Coarse industry grouping (reference 
general) 
  2.817 3 .421    
Ag/Mining/Construction/Manuf 1.074 0.676 2.519 1 .112 2.926 0.777 11.015 
Transp/Commun/Wholesale/Ret
ail 
.223 0.649 0.118 1 .731 1.250 0.350 4.463 
Finance/Real Estate/Services .293 0.552 .282 1 .595 1.341 0.454 3.959 
FMLA Considered .067 0.650 .011 1 .917 1.070 0.299 3.826 
Chronic Non-Life Threatening -.043 0.530 .007 1 .935 0.958 0.339 2.705 
Chronic Life-Threatening -.025 0.652 .002 1 .969 0.975 0.272 3.496 
Multiple Disability .758 0.421 3.247 1 .072 2.135 0.936 4.870 
Chronic Injury 1.032 0.604 2.919 1 .088 2.806 0.859 9.166 
Mental Illness 1.048 0.547 3.672 1 .055 2.852 0.976 8.328 
Personality Disorder .267 .552 .233 1 .629 1.31E+00 4.42E-01 3.85E+00 
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Alcohol/Drugs 1.000 1.288 0.603 1 .437 2.72E+00 2.18E-01 3.39E+01 
Work-Related -.779 .553 1.987 1 .159 4.59E-01 1.55E-01 1.36E+00 
Post 4-29-2002 -0.188 0.448 0.176 1 0.675 0.829 0.345 1.994 
Amount Definite -0.611 0.456 1.792 1 0.181 0.543 0.222 1.328 
Unscheduled Leave 0.007 0.511 0.000 1 0.989 1.007 0.370 2.744 
Health Care Provider Option 
(reference not considered) 
  19.133 2 0.000    
Considered not sufficiently 
definite 
1.583 0.614 6.645 1 0.010 4.869 1.461 16.220 
Considered sufficiently definite -1.947 0.629 9.592 1 0.002 0.143 0.042 0.489 
Individual circumstances 
considered 
-1.268 0.453 7.845 1 0.005 0.281 0.116 0.683 
Leave Exceeding Policy (reference not 
considered) 
  10.453 2 0.005    
No -2.412 0.898 7.205 1 0.007 0.090 0.015 0.522 
Yes 0.694 0.503 1.903 1 0.168 2.002 0.747 5.371 
Constant -2.649 1.515 3.058 1 0.08 0.071   
Cox & Snell R Square .417        
Nagelkerke R Square .606        
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